"Moral conscience, to which so many foolish
have offended and many more
have denied, is something that exists and ever existed,
is not an invention of philosophers."
Saramago
Introduction
To put in dialogue Jankelevitch and Derrida, it is necessary to have a common theme, namely, forgiveness. Now to discuss the matter with finesse, is necessary to speak of forgiveness in one place. Jankelevitch defends a religious forgiveness by giving a sense of grace, while Derrida, trying to get away from worrying about if forgiveness is a Judeo-Christian matter proposes a forgiveness with political moral implications.
have offended and many more
have denied, is something that exists and ever existed,
is not an invention of philosophers."
Saramago
Introduction
To put in dialogue Jankelevitch and Derrida, it is necessary to have a common theme, namely, forgiveness. Now to discuss the matter with finesse, is necessary to speak of forgiveness in one place. Jankelevitch defends a religious forgiveness by giving a sense of grace, while Derrida, trying to get away from worrying about if forgiveness is a Judeo-Christian matter proposes a forgiveness with political moral implications.
But what does it mean to forgive the unforgivable? Both authors seem to agree that the issue must have something to forgive that has not been atoned for: "For there to be forgiveness, it must be remembered that the irreparable or still present, the wound is still open" (Derrida, 2001 : 75); "Forgiveness is employed when the grievance remains unfixed, not-atone and guilt, and while the victim has not been compensated for his injury" (Jankelevitch, 1999: 18) However, what is there to forgive? Why stand on the situation of the victim and the aggressor? Is not the default one more way of aggression? The guiding question of this essay is this: if the repair calls for forgiveness of the victim-repair at the political level but must come from the State of which victims and perpetrators should be involved in apartheid-like, is it ethical to want repair the executioner?
In the second part will attempt an application of philosophy in reality, for as stated Jankelevitch: "The impulse of forgiveness is so impalpable, so controversial, that repels any analysis: what grips would be a philosophical discourse on that shock fugitive in that imperceptible flicker of charity "(Jankelevitch, 1999: 11) may be no such handles, but you may have speech application.
Forgiveness is a gift
I
In a broad sense, to speak of forgiveness involves talking to a religious tradition, more so if one considers the fact that the word "forgiveness" is not translated into many African languages, it is a word with a Judeo-Christian significance and perhaps Muslim (Derrida). Now it may be the issue if we do not talk of forgiveness but forgiveness all relative. (Jankelevitch, 1999: 11) To that extent, it is necessary to split the political forgiveness Forgiveness, more so if we start from the affirmation of self Jankelevitch to start your essay: "Forgiveness is, from this point of view, an event that never which came into being in history has an act that has no place in any part of space, a movement of the soul does not exist in current psychology "(Jankelevitch, 1999: 7).
If we look carefully, not just the little word has the same dye forgiveness western mentioned a moment ago. In fact, speaking of forgiveness involves talking of "fault," "Atonement," "repentance," every respect Christians, Jews or the best Muslims. Forgiveness is an action, action that Derrida defined as forgiving the unforgivable, and to that extent, we face two issues: first, overcoming language of the 'problem of forgiveness "(to speak philosophically) and, secondly, the criterion of the unforgivable.
To avoid getting into religious interpretations is that it comes from the political, because in this plane can talk to other concepts such as' responsibility ',' ethics', 'moral', 'value', 'justice' and 'truth '. However, there is also a problem here, it may be objected that forgiveness is an individual act, or, to Derrida: "I have no right to forgive or ask forgiveness on behalf of other individuals, both victims and criminals" (Derrida, 2001: 76). This means that even the state can be forgiven for its citizens. May be signed an amnesty, a peace agreement may be approved even a "law of justice and peace" but that does not mean that the victim be paid off or you have forgiven. We went for in the initial problem: What is forgiveness?
II
If Jankelevitch says that forgiveness may not have occurred in history and Derrida suspect that forgiveness is an excuse that is not forgiveness, and for that reason must forgive the unforgivable, that is, which is not justified (Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Trujillo etc.), forgiveness is an act that borders on magical, the miraculous: it becomes a gift. The gift, by definition, is a gift you have. Not everyone can forgive, and this should be clear. Only those who have been the victim can forgive. Here we find the Christian justification of turning the other cheek, since before the first strike (and as Jankelevitch may not even with that first hit) has not suffered, there has been a victim and therefore is not lawful to forgive, because it lacks the precondition having been offended. If he hit me but not to another, nor am I able to forgive for the Other.
"True forgiveness, regardless of legality, is a free gift of the victim to offender: true forgiveness is a personal relationship with someone" (Jankelevitch, 1999: 13) That someone is an ipso, a self. "Since I can not forgive the damage they did to others, forgive the damage they did to me, even though nobody has asked my forgiveness, I grant it." This from a religious reading is perfectly possible, because we understand that resentment is a state of unrest and that forgiveness is the opposite. Is forgiven for the welfare of the subject, for it to feel good about yourself. If you do not want to, if he clings to his resentment, over time, depending Jankelevitch, will mitigate the re-dry and end up feeling like a leaf detached from a tree. There will be no forgiveness there.
III
But why forgiveness is a gift? The answer (or part thereof) is given by Derrida: "if forgiveness is ethical, is, as Jankelevitch 'ethical hyperbolically," meaning that is beyond the standards, criteria and rules "( Derrida, 2001: 76). Not because of morality but because of the transgression of the rule is that forgiveness is a gift. There is a criterion - apart from being a victim-that determine what should or should not forgive, forgive and not only. If you are a victim, you can forgive. If the victim decides to do, is because it seeks reconciliation, either with the other-offender, or herself, but seek grace, tranquility (and here Jankelevitch has a point when he says that to understand is to forgive): but the Forgiveness does not mean forgetting or heal completely, if process may involve a new beginning, Arendt sense.
However, questions the ethical condition of the victim and the executioner, that is, responsibility: the question is whether you can appeal to the conscience of the executioner, it should rephrase the question for this one, to speak like the English: are you made to resist or be abused?
The ethics of forgiveness.
I
Forgiveness has two perspectives: victim and perpetrator. The victim does not do a favor to forgive the offender. Even the latter can be indifferent to be forgiven or not. Hence Jankelevitch hold the words of Christ on the cross: "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do", assuming that if they knew they had not, and from this analysis proposes a distinction between the evil is not evil , the more foolish than wicked innocent and the guilty who is more evil than stupid. These criteria are established taking into account the executioner, defining him... from a perspective of the victim.
This may seem a small thing but if you want to talk about forgiveness, we must ask the murderer, the executioner if you are interested in that forgiveness. Otherwise, forgiveness can only come in one self (intellection, language Jankelevitch), ie, the victim must grant a pardon is not going to air, but will itself. That forgiveness is not complacency, it can easily fall into resentment from that, "I have a right to be bitter and resentful, then I assert that right" (and that is the attachment to resentment Jankelevitch mentioned.) Forgiveness given when not requested a pardon is to be the conscience of the victim himself, a forgiveness that is forgiven himself. The victim must forgive her as a victim, she had allowed herself to be a victim. Talk with examples. Jean Amery well could have been suicide in the concentration camp was hard, but could have. However, he did not and, most strange ... then committed suicide.
In its arguments, Amery blames the world, a world that is alien to him, a world that can not be trusted: "Who knows whether the effect of moral responsibility resulting from the trust would not have granted and inhibited the criminal temptation and been provided that aflorase what a bright and noble can be found even in the hardened souls of evil "(Saramago, 2006: 25) Amery, like everyone, placed confidence in the world and this was betrayed, there can be no forgiveness. Not forgive himself for trusting. Addition had no one to appeal. Who were the culprits, the Germans? In a Europe that was largely anti-Semitic and a man who renounced that status, what forgiveness was there? The world, in full, with their organizations and their distribution was the culprit. You can not trust ... "you do it to yourself, just you, and that's what really hurts, to yourself, just you, you and no one else" (Just - Radiohead.)
II
So what is the ethics of forgiveness? Restore the victim and the executioner. As we make the mistake of putting eyes on the victim only when talking about forgiveness, because it is the victim who agrees to this right. But the hangman is not also entitled to a new beginning? And if any, should be sorry to access that right? The last question is answered immediately: "make repentance in the condition of the amnesty" was the task of apartheid. But how do you determine if the executioner is sorry? This is more complicated, however, in the specific case of damage done, we can say that repentance is measured by the willingness of repair, "in fact, victims often do not ask for no punishment, they just want to know where gone is the work of mourning that can continue. This is the service of a work of mourning, healing and rebuilding the body of the nation state "(Derrida, 2001: 70) Thus, the ethics of forgiveness is inclusive, victim and offender must have a willingness to reconstitution but this does not mean the victim must forgive if you do not want to, if you feel there is no chance of that. The willingness of reconstitution is-already-have understood political.
Indeed, no one sensible would argue that the executioner could claim to be forgiven. It's actually very little that can be demanded. -Forgiveness is an extreme situation, in that match and Jankelevitch Derrida. And for that reason, in such extreme situations, the executioner can demand anything, not even pity. That is up to the victim, his history and his judgment. So it was with Primo Levi: "All moral codes are, by definition, rigid: do not allow shades, or compromise, or influence each other. Taken or left en bloc "(Levi, 2006: 286). And further: "The moral universe of each, rightly interpreted, is identified with the sum of their previous experiences and thus represents an abridged form of his biography" (Levi, 2006: 292) Thus, if we eliminate the personal nature of the offense and proceed to more serious crimes, to attacks against humanity, for example, is it ethical to repair the executioner?
III
As I have insisted, the problem has been approached from the suffering, but pain who applies, who has the coercive means to do so, where is it? No one denies that the executioner to pay a debt to society has become, and that once the debt is paid it is not automatically forgiven, just as it should not. Not that the executioner should be forgiven, but certainly must play another role, otherwise he would be accused, it would kill him, he'd be in jail and that would stop the issue and no need of forgiveness and repair. There will only be an expiation for the old, corporal punishment and a Mass on behalf of the executioner for God to take pity on his soul. "When fighting a monster, beware of becoming a worse" Nietzsche.
The Repair
I
Indeed, it is ethical to repair the executioner also, not only because it is politically necessary, nor useful, but responsibility. Regardless of whether the victim has forgiven him, the executioner can and should be reinstated in society, as far as possible. We went into the basic problem of law, whether the penalty is imposed to punish and to suffer or to learn and correct.
Is it ethical for society include his executioners and look at the face, is unethical in that it is a responsibility. Make omission of that responsibility, made the blind is to let what happens happen. The ethic of responsibility demands a character, and the executioner there, is as real as the victim. It may be preferred to one another because both are products of a process, Amery called "torture." This torture also responds to another process. This reasoning comes the initial question of whether one is guilty by omission, if the omission is not another way of attacking.
II
To answer these questions is necessary to stop on the road and deal with only two questions and they show any insight (to use Jankélévicth). Two questions raised by Albert Camus, two questions that call for responsibility, two questions that, after Auschwitz, must be answered:
"" Yes or no, directly or indirectly, any abuse you want and violate? Yes or no, directly or indirectly, do you mistreat and violate? "All those who answered no to both questions are automatically confronted with a series of consequences that must change their way of posing the problem. " (Camus, 2002: 86)
Consequently, if we say no, we face a liability. Repair the executioner as such, ie, remove the label of executioner is part of that repair, as well as the victim must cease to be, as far as possible. The forgiveness of the unforgivable is a way to approach this process. Because "Hurbinek died in early March 1945, free but not redeemed" (Levi, 2006: 264). And although no Hurbinek killed, all were his executioners, and to leave a testimony like that, Primo Levi is appealing to the conscience of all, that is, it is also assuming as executioner.
"We dreamed at night fierce
Dense and violent dreams
Dream with the soul and body:
Back, eat, tell what happened. Until he heard stifled brief
The Order of Dawn "Wstawac";
And we heart to pieces.
We have now returned home,
We gorged belly,
We have finished our story.
It's time. Soon we will hear again
The foreign order "Wstawac" "Primo Levi.
In the second part will attempt an application of philosophy in reality, for as stated Jankelevitch: "The impulse of forgiveness is so impalpable, so controversial, that repels any analysis: what grips would be a philosophical discourse on that shock fugitive in that imperceptible flicker of charity "(Jankelevitch, 1999: 11) may be no such handles, but you may have speech application.
Forgiveness is a gift
I
In a broad sense, to speak of forgiveness involves talking to a religious tradition, more so if one considers the fact that the word "forgiveness" is not translated into many African languages, it is a word with a Judeo-Christian significance and perhaps Muslim (Derrida). Now it may be the issue if we do not talk of forgiveness but forgiveness all relative. (Jankelevitch, 1999: 11) To that extent, it is necessary to split the political forgiveness Forgiveness, more so if we start from the affirmation of self Jankelevitch to start your essay: "Forgiveness is, from this point of view, an event that never which came into being in history has an act that has no place in any part of space, a movement of the soul does not exist in current psychology "(Jankelevitch, 1999: 7).
If we look carefully, not just the little word has the same dye forgiveness western mentioned a moment ago. In fact, speaking of forgiveness involves talking of "fault," "Atonement," "repentance," every respect Christians, Jews or the best Muslims. Forgiveness is an action, action that Derrida defined as forgiving the unforgivable, and to that extent, we face two issues: first, overcoming language of the 'problem of forgiveness "(to speak philosophically) and, secondly, the criterion of the unforgivable.
To avoid getting into religious interpretations is that it comes from the political, because in this plane can talk to other concepts such as' responsibility ',' ethics', 'moral', 'value', 'justice' and 'truth '. However, there is also a problem here, it may be objected that forgiveness is an individual act, or, to Derrida: "I have no right to forgive or ask forgiveness on behalf of other individuals, both victims and criminals" (Derrida, 2001: 76). This means that even the state can be forgiven for its citizens. May be signed an amnesty, a peace agreement may be approved even a "law of justice and peace" but that does not mean that the victim be paid off or you have forgiven. We went for in the initial problem: What is forgiveness?
II
If Jankelevitch says that forgiveness may not have occurred in history and Derrida suspect that forgiveness is an excuse that is not forgiveness, and for that reason must forgive the unforgivable, that is, which is not justified (Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Trujillo etc.), forgiveness is an act that borders on magical, the miraculous: it becomes a gift. The gift, by definition, is a gift you have. Not everyone can forgive, and this should be clear. Only those who have been the victim can forgive. Here we find the Christian justification of turning the other cheek, since before the first strike (and as Jankelevitch may not even with that first hit) has not suffered, there has been a victim and therefore is not lawful to forgive, because it lacks the precondition having been offended. If he hit me but not to another, nor am I able to forgive for the Other.
"True forgiveness, regardless of legality, is a free gift of the victim to offender: true forgiveness is a personal relationship with someone" (Jankelevitch, 1999: 13) That someone is an ipso, a self. "Since I can not forgive the damage they did to others, forgive the damage they did to me, even though nobody has asked my forgiveness, I grant it." This from a religious reading is perfectly possible, because we understand that resentment is a state of unrest and that forgiveness is the opposite. Is forgiven for the welfare of the subject, for it to feel good about yourself. If you do not want to, if he clings to his resentment, over time, depending Jankelevitch, will mitigate the re-dry and end up feeling like a leaf detached from a tree. There will be no forgiveness there.
III
But why forgiveness is a gift? The answer (or part thereof) is given by Derrida: "if forgiveness is ethical, is, as Jankelevitch 'ethical hyperbolically," meaning that is beyond the standards, criteria and rules "( Derrida, 2001: 76). Not because of morality but because of the transgression of the rule is that forgiveness is a gift. There is a criterion - apart from being a victim-that determine what should or should not forgive, forgive and not only. If you are a victim, you can forgive. If the victim decides to do, is because it seeks reconciliation, either with the other-offender, or herself, but seek grace, tranquility (and here Jankelevitch has a point when he says that to understand is to forgive): but the Forgiveness does not mean forgetting or heal completely, if process may involve a new beginning, Arendt sense.
However, questions the ethical condition of the victim and the executioner, that is, responsibility: the question is whether you can appeal to the conscience of the executioner, it should rephrase the question for this one, to speak like the English: are you made to resist or be abused?
The ethics of forgiveness.
I
Forgiveness has two perspectives: victim and perpetrator. The victim does not do a favor to forgive the offender. Even the latter can be indifferent to be forgiven or not. Hence Jankelevitch hold the words of Christ on the cross: "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do", assuming that if they knew they had not, and from this analysis proposes a distinction between the evil is not evil , the more foolish than wicked innocent and the guilty who is more evil than stupid. These criteria are established taking into account the executioner, defining him... from a perspective of the victim.
This may seem a small thing but if you want to talk about forgiveness, we must ask the murderer, the executioner if you are interested in that forgiveness. Otherwise, forgiveness can only come in one self (intellection, language Jankelevitch), ie, the victim must grant a pardon is not going to air, but will itself. That forgiveness is not complacency, it can easily fall into resentment from that, "I have a right to be bitter and resentful, then I assert that right" (and that is the attachment to resentment Jankelevitch mentioned.) Forgiveness given when not requested a pardon is to be the conscience of the victim himself, a forgiveness that is forgiven himself. The victim must forgive her as a victim, she had allowed herself to be a victim. Talk with examples. Jean Amery well could have been suicide in the concentration camp was hard, but could have. However, he did not and, most strange ... then committed suicide.
In its arguments, Amery blames the world, a world that is alien to him, a world that can not be trusted: "Who knows whether the effect of moral responsibility resulting from the trust would not have granted and inhibited the criminal temptation and been provided that aflorase what a bright and noble can be found even in the hardened souls of evil "(Saramago, 2006: 25) Amery, like everyone, placed confidence in the world and this was betrayed, there can be no forgiveness. Not forgive himself for trusting. Addition had no one to appeal. Who were the culprits, the Germans? In a Europe that was largely anti-Semitic and a man who renounced that status, what forgiveness was there? The world, in full, with their organizations and their distribution was the culprit. You can not trust ... "you do it to yourself, just you, and that's what really hurts, to yourself, just you, you and no one else" (Just - Radiohead.)
II
So what is the ethics of forgiveness? Restore the victim and the executioner. As we make the mistake of putting eyes on the victim only when talking about forgiveness, because it is the victim who agrees to this right. But the hangman is not also entitled to a new beginning? And if any, should be sorry to access that right? The last question is answered immediately: "make repentance in the condition of the amnesty" was the task of apartheid. But how do you determine if the executioner is sorry? This is more complicated, however, in the specific case of damage done, we can say that repentance is measured by the willingness of repair, "in fact, victims often do not ask for no punishment, they just want to know where gone is the work of mourning that can continue. This is the service of a work of mourning, healing and rebuilding the body of the nation state "(Derrida, 2001: 70) Thus, the ethics of forgiveness is inclusive, victim and offender must have a willingness to reconstitution but this does not mean the victim must forgive if you do not want to, if you feel there is no chance of that. The willingness of reconstitution is-already-have understood political.
Indeed, no one sensible would argue that the executioner could claim to be forgiven. It's actually very little that can be demanded. -Forgiveness is an extreme situation, in that match and Jankelevitch Derrida. And for that reason, in such extreme situations, the executioner can demand anything, not even pity. That is up to the victim, his history and his judgment. So it was with Primo Levi: "All moral codes are, by definition, rigid: do not allow shades, or compromise, or influence each other. Taken or left en bloc "(Levi, 2006: 286). And further: "The moral universe of each, rightly interpreted, is identified with the sum of their previous experiences and thus represents an abridged form of his biography" (Levi, 2006: 292) Thus, if we eliminate the personal nature of the offense and proceed to more serious crimes, to attacks against humanity, for example, is it ethical to repair the executioner?
III
As I have insisted, the problem has been approached from the suffering, but pain who applies, who has the coercive means to do so, where is it? No one denies that the executioner to pay a debt to society has become, and that once the debt is paid it is not automatically forgiven, just as it should not. Not that the executioner should be forgiven, but certainly must play another role, otherwise he would be accused, it would kill him, he'd be in jail and that would stop the issue and no need of forgiveness and repair. There will only be an expiation for the old, corporal punishment and a Mass on behalf of the executioner for God to take pity on his soul. "When fighting a monster, beware of becoming a worse" Nietzsche.
The Repair
I
Indeed, it is ethical to repair the executioner also, not only because it is politically necessary, nor useful, but responsibility. Regardless of whether the victim has forgiven him, the executioner can and should be reinstated in society, as far as possible. We went into the basic problem of law, whether the penalty is imposed to punish and to suffer or to learn and correct.
Is it ethical for society include his executioners and look at the face, is unethical in that it is a responsibility. Make omission of that responsibility, made the blind is to let what happens happen. The ethic of responsibility demands a character, and the executioner there, is as real as the victim. It may be preferred to one another because both are products of a process, Amery called "torture." This torture also responds to another process. This reasoning comes the initial question of whether one is guilty by omission, if the omission is not another way of attacking.
II
To answer these questions is necessary to stop on the road and deal with only two questions and they show any insight (to use Jankélévicth). Two questions raised by Albert Camus, two questions that call for responsibility, two questions that, after Auschwitz, must be answered:
"" Yes or no, directly or indirectly, any abuse you want and violate? Yes or no, directly or indirectly, do you mistreat and violate? "All those who answered no to both questions are automatically confronted with a series of consequences that must change their way of posing the problem. " (Camus, 2002: 86)
Consequently, if we say no, we face a liability. Repair the executioner as such, ie, remove the label of executioner is part of that repair, as well as the victim must cease to be, as far as possible. The forgiveness of the unforgivable is a way to approach this process. Because "Hurbinek died in early March 1945, free but not redeemed" (Levi, 2006: 264). And although no Hurbinek killed, all were his executioners, and to leave a testimony like that, Primo Levi is appealing to the conscience of all, that is, it is also assuming as executioner.
"We dreamed at night fierce
Dense and violent dreams
Dream with the soul and body:
Back, eat, tell what happened. Until he heard stifled brief
The Order of Dawn "Wstawac";
And we heart to pieces.
We have now returned home,
We gorged belly,
We have finished our story.
It's time. Soon we will hear again
The foreign order "Wstawac" "Primo Levi.
Literature
· Jankelevitch, Vladimir. THE forgiveness. Editorial Seix Barral, 1999
· Derrida, Jacques.Word! Editorial Trot, 2001.
· Amery, Jean. Beyond guilt and atonement. Attempts to overcome a victim of violence. Pretexts, 2004
· Saramago, Jose. Blindness. Editorial Nomos, 2006
· Levi, Primo. Auschwitz trilogy. Editorial The Aleph, 2006
· Camus, Albert. Chronicles. Alianza Editorial, 2002
· Jankelevitch, Vladimir. THE forgiveness. Editorial Seix Barral, 1999
· Derrida, Jacques.Word! Editorial Trot, 2001.
· Amery, Jean. Beyond guilt and atonement. Attempts to overcome a victim of violence. Pretexts, 2004
· Saramago, Jose. Blindness. Editorial Nomos, 2006
· Levi, Primo. Auschwitz trilogy. Editorial The Aleph, 2006
· Camus, Albert. Chronicles. Alianza Editorial, 2002
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