Life is real

To be in love is to fell
you can be everything,
to do anything.
The way you make me fell
the last days that go by
is like to reborn.

As well as you, I don't want
to be something to someone,
but everything for you.
Think about it, and you will
see, like me, that
life is real.

I want to give you
the best I can.
I don't have much time,
this is it, and everything
will be allright. From 
here to forever.

'Cause you're something 
real, very real,
how so long have you been here?

Paradise

I
I guess I must be strong now,
"You're the man here", you said.
But this is so much hard
So I won't explain something
I can't understand...this 
felling that makes me mad.

Play guitar and sing along
is not the same without you.
And when it's getting better
I wonder if it would be different
if you were here, if you only knew
that there is a boy who only loves you.

II
I won't tied your hands and soul
I know that  our day will come
when we met the music we used to love
and be able to believe in our own love.

I've tried to convince myself
that no matter, anything,
but you know ain't not true
because you're in heaven, in paradise,
and I know that is good for you,
but I want to go now...

So I don't believe this world.
Since the day you pass away
I love jazz and nothing more.
The better you feel, the better you sing
So before I made this wrong stuff
I'll go to my own paradise. 

Love me if you dare.

For you I sang songs, 

ain't thought that you'd go.

And yes...I'd dare to love you.

Always you...my one and only love.

Come and heal my wounds

kiss my heart and soul,

love me if you dare,

the rest I don't care.

So lets going to start again.

'Cause I want a woman, 

not a bottle opener.

A girl you can account there.

At rainy and sunny days.

At good and bad news.

I accept. I say yes. Will

you love me, will you dare...?

Amy, amy, amy...

I know how absurd it is to write to a dead person. So this is not just a letter for her, but to remember what's left. When there is not much we will not go in vain subtleties. If I were a musician I would write songs to the Queen of Soul to sing them in heaven. 

By fortune I met her through music, not through scandals. I met her when someone brought to me the album "Duets II" by Tony Bennett, because on september 14 last year, I was listening to the radio about Winehouse's death (I never had heard her before her death) and they put the single that she made with Benett. So, when they brought me the cd, I put it and was thrilled with that song. After listening a few times, thinking it over, I began to listen to Amy Winehouse seriously. And I concluded that it would be impossible not to love a woman as sweet as she was. I will not say that I understand her (I'm not interested in it). I will say that she didn't need to be saved, or wouldn't wanted. I do not think she would like to become a myth. Her death and those who complain it, complain the fact of not being able to listen to her anymore. It is a selfish and ridiculous complaint. She did what she could; when she could not with fame, she left.

Those who say that she was not a jazz singer, listen to her version of "Teach me tonight", or listen to her song "Amy, Amy, Amy" and see whether or not a jazz singer. Of course, I'm not obsessive, and I know that not all the presentations were good, she ussualy jump in bad shape on stage. Also, I know that her style, uncomplicated, improvising in each song can not please most of the time (I dare to say she never sang the same song in the same way twice). It is unfortunate that such things happen. It is regrettable to take refuge in drugs. I would say that one at twenty is not ready to deal with the fame that way, and what is mere chance product of similar causes and consequences, such as excessive fame in youth ("the club of twenty-seven") is has become an almost cult status. For my part, I remember her as the star that shone. 

To me she was like Janis Joplin. A woman who could make love in every song and then feel a deep void that was evident on her face. Perhaps it was her reincarnation, maybe now achieved leaving her human form. What we care about that! Amy was in the right place to make the music she knew make. In any case, I'm glad to hear it achieved little or much she did. She is now a star shining on the sky.

For good or for bad, the disgrace only wants strong hearts. This is probably the first lesson that I've learned from she. Thanks.

Amy, amy, amy.

Teach me tonight.

Love is a losing game.

Stronger than me 

And this rare song showing her voice.

Bolero - By Julio Cortázar

This is my free version of a poem of Julio Cortazar. 

Bolero - Julio Cortázar

What a vanity to imagine

that I can give you all, love and bliss,

paths, music, toys.

All of that is true:

I give you all what is mine, is true;

but all of mine is not enough for you.

Like to me, is not enough that you

give me all of yours.

Because that, we will never be

the perfect couple, like the post card,

if we are not able to accept

that only in maths,

two is the result of one plus one.

Thereabouts I see a paper

in which only reads:

You always was my mirror,

it means that to see me I had to see you.

And this little fragment:

The slow loveless's machine

the gears of the reflux

bodies that left the pillows

beddings and kisses.

And stand up against the mirror,

They wonder to themselves,

not already seeing between them,

not now naked to each other,

I don't love you anymore,

sweetheart.

How could be helpful the language philosophy raising and answering policial and social questions?

"This book wants put on limits of the thinking, 

or better, not to the thinking but the expression 

of the thinking; because making limits to the thinking 

we would have to be able that think on the two sides 

of the limit, and therefore we would have be able 

to think what is cannot be think. This limit only 

can be made in language and what is outside 

the limit is -and will be always- a totally nonsense"

Wittgenstein

I

Even this matter is very noisy and complicated to be solved in a few pages, in addition, even if we could solve this thing in paper the real trouble is to solve this on the reality, something very difficult; even knowing all these things, the question must be planted taking in mind that we are against a real trouble, and the high education in a center of production of knowledge. Of course this is not new, I am taking these ideas from a Wlad Godzich's text, called "literary theory and critique of the culture", in which he writes:

"the economic recession from the seventies and the period of the high inflation with closed that decade pushed so many students, and even more than students the university administrators, to something that is best known as "new vocationalism", an utilitarian conception of the university that anounced that its actual transformation in a center of supplying of the new strenght productive of the postindustrial society: the knowledge (Godzich, 1998:9) 

Godzich says that is very problematic the specialization of the language at the moment to communicate knowledge between the disciplines, and one of the causes that he show, one of many others, is to understand the university like a formation center, a process that was called in United States (country in which he stand his analyzes) like "new vocationalism". This phenomenon is a product of the social and economic conditions that made in the seventies and eighties that the United States government tried to make that people go for working, and they used the university for that aim.

So well, from the language philosophy this matter is more complicated if we take in mind some of the aphorisms about the first Wittgenstein at his 'tractatus'. He defines language as 'limit' and doing that he is also defining language as possibility. What is not thinkable is not thinkable, is what he says using a tautology. However, if the language is the limit of the world in so far as it has sense, which consequences have this in a situation like is described by Godzich, namely the specialization of language and the confinement between many different languages?

However we must have pretty clear from where is talking Godzich and how he understands the language to translate it to a political ambit. In effect he stands from a point of view in which he see the difference between "language" and "written culture", being the first an "universal mediator" (Godzich, p. 17). In order with that, he understand the written culture as a product of the need to transmit knowledge which is public, being the written culture an ambit that belong to a public domain; from there is from he is discussing about the specialization of the language, firstly the political language and then the literary critic language. After that he says easier:

the existence of the domains of the practice activity which are characterize by special languages is legal, in agreement with the basic principles of the ideology of the written culture, only if those special languages can be translated in an universal language and if the product of that translate is understandable universally. (Godzich, 1998: 17)

If the trouble is that, it is understandable that the literary theory has points in common with the formation of the language, more so if taking in account that the analyzes made by literary theorists used to be formal, with independence of the contents of the text. The words of Wittgenstein, "the figure represent which is representing, independently of its true or falsehood, through the figuration form" (Tractatus, 2.22). In order of those ideas it's not discussing the existence of the specialized language by itself but the translatability of those languages.

With all of that, the question of the language has to include an essential considearation and is how we want to communicate something, because language is not only words. Although is with words which allow the think, is possible to translate ideas to images, to sounds, and in that sense the specialized language is not a problem of traductability anymore and become a problem of 'instrumentalization':

while one would have expected that a crisis of written culture conducive to a greater appreciation for the multiplicity of functions performed by the language, especially its ability to encode and transcode the cultural experience and provide guidelines for interpretation, management and processing, a encounters a new manipulation of language, in which it is fragmented into a multiplicity of autonomous languages?, unrelated, and the competition to acquire is restricted to only one of them (Godzich 1998: 13)

II

So, if we wait a moment and begin to think this business in relation with the actual situation from our country (Colombia) and we start to ask what we are understanding by education and ask for the purposes of the legal reform (made by the colombian government), ultimately the problem is not the investment of private companies but the disappear of the public education. Although in the discus students are arguing weakly ("our country needs poets", as if only on public universities people could study literature), the discuss is made at many levels: on the one hand we have the disappear of public education and, on the other hand, the role of the university as formation center of manpower. Perhaps we have to discuss the role of the education technical and technological, but in what I am interested is in this: students and politicians are not communicating between themselves.

The student mobilization is an 'expression' of a situation, and beyond the facts, there is a group which is product of a general perception: the economic factor implicit on the reform that maybe has anything in common with the value of the university but in fact has elements in common with the money that the student has to make once he/she manage become a professional. This way of understanding the topic is, in words of Godzich, a product of a state of things that have factors of unemployed and other things. In fact this is a good example: while the manifestations are made by students, how we could offer something from the language philosophy?

What philosophy makes is to offer concepts and categories, ways to analyze, search of methods of expression newfangled, extend horizons. This is not ignored by Wittgenstein and because that he purposes to put "limits of the thinking" because "what is not sayable must be shown". With that assertion we are susceptible of sum up this "shown" to an aesthetic question: in effect, by looking for new ways to see, to analyze and to interpret this matter is aesthetic in so far as it is 'creation', but the problems don't change, because of it this conception can be move to politics and culture, a try that its pretty far to be new and it could be traced in Goldmann and Luckács, for example.

III

In effect if we assume with Wittgenstein that the world is the things that happen, the language is not there only to allow us to speak of those things but to produce those things. Van Dijk says in his work "Text and context" that a very important discover of language philosophy is precisely to find that we made more than only talk when we are talking, because the relation word-world is pretty more fundamental than a simple act of "show", something that is resolved by Wittgenstein with his concept of "possibility", where the language let us a space to express new things, getting us away of informative tautologies and allowing us to express things in propositions that, true or false, are on their structure -from the language- possible, with independence of the context of enunciation, what bring us the possible of literature, in last instance:

the studies of literature have been installed on the much more appreciate territory of feeling and experience. At who belong this experience and what kind of feelings he/she experiments, is a different question (Eagleton, 1988: 39)

IV

With these reflections I believe that is possible to translate the words on a facts, like the students, whose show their position and fight for it. For that, the culture and politic problem is how people perceive the march and, mainly, its understandable why are the students protesting. I am making this comment because a politician said that the students must be "electrified" and put them on a classroom. He said that because he didn't understand the march, and the role of the philosophy is precisely to change that way to understand the trouble and then be able to offer an answer to the topics. So this is mine.

Philosophy has the ability to bring tools of analysis useful at the moment to discuss. Although is true that university must not be understand as a formation of manpower, is also true that in a social conditions like our country has we couldn't live dreaming with a scholar and educated society, because in Colombia the education is a synonymous of poverty; a perception that is easy to see on people which think that to study must a making-money business because if this is not it you are losing your time -especially if you study humanities. Now, in the territory of the law 30, the reform of the education, the professor Cajiao show an essential problem and he says that students, in their attempt to drop the reform they are lose sight of the good stuff that the reform has. And the other big problem that he shows is that the resources that really goes to education are useless:

topics like enlargement in times of learning of the students, learning other languages and the linkage with high school must be studied very deep to become them in some more really than just affirmations. Some of these programs have already begin and it's worth to evaluate if they are being effective or if they are being a spend of money that, finally, are not producing anything (Cajiao, 2011)

This revision is a business of citizens but philosophy can bring the tools for it, like determinate the quality of education, what is a special factor which has not been treated with the necessary attention and which is, maybe, one of the most important discusses about the reform, through this question: how many students will manage enter to an university with high standards of quality?

So, the theorycal purposes made here are only an example of a guide to resolve and to face political and social problems. Beyond of Wittgenstein said, beyond Godzich said, their considerations can be applied to the reality: for example, if words are the limit of my world, in political language, what does it mean this affirmation? Perhaps that social moves, in this case students move, is a language that don't say anything but show something. What is happening is that we have to overcome the conformity, and this is a trouble that stands in the limit between what is possible to say and what is necessary to show, specially, in the way in which we are expressing ourselves.

Dissertation: about use and abuse of language philosophy

"language is the sedimentation of human experience" Husserl

Introduction.

This present work try to speak about a series of conditions around some considerations made by Teun A. Van dijk, namely: how semantic and pragmatic can be articulate on the speech? This work stands in its attempt to establish that relation between 'use and abuse of language philosophy', what is our goal. I think that it's possible, with Van Dijk, to establish a 'science of the text' which can show, by categories, the different kind of texts without referring of a specific conditions on a specific situation, which is the matter of a particular science like semantic, for example.

So, we have a science of the text that can speak about semantic as well as pragmatic on the language, or the way of articulation of those languages in context specifically of literature; the development of the theories literature, linguistic, semantic, correspond to the literary criticism, respectively. But this possibility of a science of the text can be use in an abusive way if we pretend to make universal the categories of analysis and excluding the facts that happen, as if the only important thing was the language and the way in which its appear. Let's go to see what happen with the thesis.

For now, our material are three ancient texts, which are: Cratilo by Plato; peri hermeneias by Aristotle and De magistro by Saint Augustine. What we will going to do is a small summary of the texts and a comment, making a purpose about if is legal or not talk about a 'science of the text' in the described terms. On the other hand, we will going to use a few ideas of Rorty, Van Dijk and Terry Eagleton, to feed up the discuss that we are trying to present on this work.

Cratilo

"I would find greater to know

what do you think about the

accuracy of the names"

During all the dialogue of Plato we can guess two things that are so interesting to Plato. First of them is to know if the names of the things have some in common with the essence of the things itself or if they are only conventions made between humans; the second one is, if names are not conventions, who input the names?. In order to explain this last thing, is appropriate go to the text and see the two thesis that Plato use through the entire dialogue: in effect, or the names have a direct relation with the essence of the things or not; naturalism or conventionalism. In the dialogue Socrates tries to support the naturalism, saying:

for that reason, if all is not for everyone equal at the same time and in all time, nor everyone of the beings are different to each individual, is clear that things have a be which belong to them and is conscious. The things have no relation with us and neither let us manipulate by our imagination, but they are for its own sake and in relation with their own being in accord with nature (cratilo: 20)

This has been said because of this: the things cannot be for everyone what they think the things are, because there are times and spaces which vitiate the sense, and its clear that the dog is still a dog today and tomorrow, the same that human an animals. And if we can to announce this things in different times, then there is no difference and the essence of the dog remains, what allow us to still bring it that name. If every thing has its essence, for which essence there is a specific name:

So if we talk as we think is correct to talk, will we speak correctly, or will we going to speak better if we speak as its natural that things being spoken, and, on the contrary, if we don't do it will we going to fail? (...) So will we have to name like is common that things being named and with the natural instrument, and not as we want, if we have the possibility to make any agreement about it? And in that case, will we have some success? (cratilo: 21)

From all past reflection Socrates concludes that if the drill is for drilling then the name is for nominate, what makes the name the category of 'instrument'. So "to use the name in a good way", will say Socrates, is use the name "among the function of to teach, something that have much in common with Saint Augustine and his "De Magistro", when he affirm that 'the word hurt the ear', in an exercise of 'remember'. Now well, before that, Socrates says that the name is an (im)position, independently if its a convention. The matter turns much more complicated while Socrates says that there is distance between who knows the construction tool and who use the tool.

-Soc. -Well, who is going to decide if is possible  to find in any kind of wood the best form of the shuttle: the maker, or who is going to use it, the weaver?

-Herm. - Is more reasonable, Socartes, that be the weaver decide it. (Cratilo: 25)

Then, after of a large analysis in which the speakers spend time looking for the origin of many names, as well of gods as concepts, Socrates find two things: 1) the names have a relation, mostly, with the movement, and he remember Heraclitus and his "everything flows" by the way to the movement, but this reflexion stop at the moment to speak about justice, which has no equality like other names like "episteme" and "rema" 2) Is the thinking, from gods or humans, which input the names (Cratilo: 60). For this way Socrates says that from the names the next thing is the beautiful, in a pretty good words-game (understandable only in ancient Greek) between "the nominative" (tò kaloûn) and "the beauty things" (kalá). 

This worry of Plato about the origin and use of the language born of understanding it as 'instrument' that is used by made something. Plato wants to establish the correspondence between words and things, some ontology relation that allow find that relation. However Plato does not establish the question for the correct use of language; that is to say, he believes that language can be used good or bad, as any other instrument, and is in the use where the utility of language can be determinate. Is Aristotle who made the ask of the structure of the language.

Peri hermeneias.

"for its own sake, verbs are names and means something

-because who talk stop the thinking,

and who heard rest-, but

they are not suggest if <something> do exist or don't"

The worry of Plato is about the exactitude of the names at their use, but Aristotle changes the problem and begin to ask for the logic structure of the names. In effect, both philosophers want to determinate the way in which the truth 'appears in the language', but they chose different ways. At his 'peri hermeneias', Aristotle tries to define what is a verb and a name, and from there to establish what is true and falsehood, contradiction and contrary, only for saying some of them.

Now well, to create a logical structure which be able to show the announces and the way in which they show true or falsehood, Aristotle creates the notion of 'possibility', and he uses it in many ways. First of all, he is not interested in Plato's question about the essence of the words and the relation word-essence; he believe that this is a conventionalism:

And, [5] as the words are not the same for everyone, neither the sounds are the same. So, about the things are signs basically, the affections of the soul, <are> the same for everyone, and about these things are likeness, the things, also <are> the same (Aristotle: 2)

His interest is the 'possibility' to say true or falsehood: "so then, nothing is or becomes by random, nor turns into anything randomly, nor will be or will not be, but everything are <what they are> by need" (Aristotle: 12). This opposition between need and possibility is what lately forms the question about what the truth is only in the context of the proposition. Probably what the stagirite is looking for, once he find the conventionalism of the language, is to create a structure in which everyone can participate to know about what are we talking when we are talking; or for saying with him, the similarity of the affections of the soul.

With a structure of the language the matter has anything in common with knowing the relation between words and things, because as he says, a name an a verb can mean something but cannot determinate if that "something" do exist or don't. In order of these ideas, is legal to think that the stagirite understand the language as an instrument that we can use to affirm or to deny:

and affirmation is the assertion of something link to something, and negation is the assertion of something separated to something. Now, as its possible, to say that doesn't exist what do exist and to say that do exist what doesn't exist, and the same thing about the different times of the present, we could deny all of what one affirm and affirm all of one deny; so is evident that to any affirmation correspond a negation and to any negation correspond an affirmation. And this is a contradiction; I say that are opponents <affirmation and negation> of the same about the same (but not so the same name, or any of the other ways we distinguish against sophistical distortions) (Aristotle: 7)

The language has this possibility; however the possibility is not limitless, and cannot be said anything bye anyway. In effect, the possibilities of the language to express truths and falsehoods are explained by Aristotle with the notion of "plus" and "subtract", as he can say the following conclusion:

is clear that the real one is not possible to be contrary to the real one, nor the opinion and the contradiction; because they are contrary ones <that talk> about the opposites, and about these is possible that the same <person> speak truthful: on the contrary, is not possible that the opposites are in the same time at the same place (Aristotle: 30)

From the same point of view one thing cannot be the same at the same time will say Aristotle. By introducing the concept 'time' he is saying that Being, one, unchangeable, has no relation with the language, which is changeable and treats about changeable things. Unintentionally, Aristotle anticipates that the languages has the ability to change things, because he believes that there is a needed of the things: "Because we wouldn't have spend time in discussing and worrying <thinking> that, if we made this move, it will happen this thing, and if we don't, if won't" (Aristotle: 13). The use of the language is in this case to establish the conditions in which the truth appear; contexts indicates if the propositions do work or don't in a specific case. Ultimately Aristotle defends a position in which the context of enunciation create the frame in which the language establish its possibilities in every speech-act. If the context change, the language change, and for the necessary things its no needed to think what would happen, but how can we determinate the neediness of the things and the language?

By now we can say that the need of the language has anything in common with an ontology between the word and the thing, a relation that is able to show the need that the word for a thing is only own and there is a correspondence with the being of the thing, because Aristotle recognize that there are many languages, different in sounds and this makes difficult to speak about the being of the thing from a linguistic point of view; from an ontological point of view the being is need and is one, so the problem has been solved. However this problem will going to come back in the Middle-Age as "universals" and "particulars" from the hand of Guillermo of Ockam and others.

De Magistro.

“At ego puto ese quoddam genus docendi

per commemorationem, magnum sane,

quid in nostra hac sermocinatione res ipsa indicabit”.

Augustine of Hippo in his text "De magistro" develop a conception of the language as a tool of the speak that can be used to teach (Augustine: 683). This kind of conception can be anticipated from the tittle, in which he shows the way of the argumentation. On the first chapter, Augustine says: "So who is speaking, show externally the sign of his volition through the articulation of the sound) (Augustine, 1947: 685) This notion of the sign is one of the most important topics on the whole text, because the signs allow me remember: "through the locution what we do is to remember, when the memory, where the words are recorded, bring us, around itself, to the spirit of the things, about the words are signs" (Augustine, 1947: 687)

The sign cannot be without representing something (Augustine: 687). Augustine says that every single word is a sign but he cannot explain it when he uses the word 'nihil'. "For that reason, [nihil] is not a sign, because means nothing; and falsely we have said that every word is sign or means something" (Augustine, 1947: 687). The attempt to explain how the words are signs which represent itself is, lately, a reduction to the absurd; Augustine believes that if the task of the language is teach, if we go from word to word we teach with the example, and signs are not made anymore by words but by gesticulations:

have not you seen how men almost speak by gesticulation with deaf, and the same deaf ask with gestures and answer, teach, show everything that they want to? In this case not only the visible things can be show by words, but sounds too, flavors and similar things (Augustine, 1947: 691)

Every single question in the dialogue between Augustine and his son Adeodato goes to how we have to teach, because learning is here to remember, a remembrance. About that Manuel Martinez wrote in the introduction of De Magistro:

The soul in its essence has prefigured all of those eternal truths, and when the soul knows those truths, with the help of God, then realized about what it already knew virtually, and, in this sense, soul remember. Saint Augustine conserves, after all, the word 'reminiscence', and he throw up the plato's meaning to the word and introduces his own doctrine, bringing to that word a sense of illumination (Augustine, 1947: 642)

Augustine shows a definition of the signs, and at the same time he wants treating the question about how we have to teach something: "Because we call universally signs to the whole things that mean something, along we can account with the words" (Augustine, 1947: 701). He has already shown that we teach with words but about we talk are something 'visible', that is not in the word but in the world. However if we speak about words, then Augustine explains the reciprocity of the signs and about it is that he establish the idea of remember in fifth chapter, where he says:

"if this is it, then every word is a name and every name a word (...) You realize, I think, that everything which is meaning something grow up through the articulation of the voice, hurt the ear to activate the sensation and its transmitted to the memory to bring knowledge (Augustine, 1947: 705)

To a science of the text.

"The world does not speak. Only we can do that.

The world, once we have ajusted

to the program of the language, can make that

we got determinate beliefs.

But it cannot give us a language 

to be spoken by ourselves. 

Only others human beings can do that." Rorty

The reciprocity about meaning words by words is a problem of language philosophy about context of enunciation. Is because this that Van Dijk is interested in begin a 'science of the text' about it must be possible take in account the linguistic problems as a one problem, like a "new interdisciplinar science" (Van Dijk, 1983: 13) With the re-count of classic texts we can see that all of them understand the language as a tool which is developing on its use; Van Dijk wouldn't have any trouble in recognize this as a true, but the general problem is that the words which are referring to other words in context of enunciation more and more specific, and this makes so difficult the study:

Also the concept of "style" is referring to the use of the language, but in this case is alluding to a special properties, individualizing, inside of special social contexts, and to functions and actions/effects special inside the communication process. So because the style cannot be studied properly through words, groups of words or individual phrases, because is referring to the linguistic statement as totality, also in this case it would be more properly a frame of the science of the text. (Van Dijk, 1983: 18)

Those kinds of worries have its referent on the language, about Van Dijk speak at the moment to rise up the distinctions between the different branch of study of the language and base his 'science'. "...Linguistic treats the different ways about "forms of use of the language", it means: about texts" (Van Dijk, 1983: 18). However, still we have the question: to which point has validity to establish a 'science of the text'? Van Dijk tries to establish a category, a general frame of study about the different kind of texts, and the science of the text becomes an interdisciplinar science. In order of these ideas, he says that "we can considerate the rhetoric as a historical precedent of the science of the text if we pay attention to the general orientation of the classic rhetoric, consists of the description of the texts and its specific functions. (Van Dijk, 1983: 19)

The advantage of a science of the text is the ability which is acquired to take in account social, cultural, philosophical problems (only for mentioning some of them), eluding specific contexts, not because those context are not important, but leaving them to the sciences which has the ability to solve those problems with more precision: "one of the tendencies of the anthropological investigation, namely: the 'ethnography of speaking', what have interest mostly about the description of those coincidences of differences of the text and communications on different cultural contexts" (Van Dijk, 1983: 27) And is on the context (in the use of the language) where the limits of the language can be determinate. By the way, Rorty said on "Contingency, Irony and Solidarity":

The temptation of looking some standards is a specie of the temptation, more general, of think that the world, or the human being, have an intrinsic nature. That is to say, is the result of the temptation of privilege one of many language in which we habitually describe the world or describe ourselves (...) if any time we manage conciliate with the idea that the reality is, in its most part, indifferent of the descriptions that we made of it, and that the I (...) is created for the use of a lexicon, finally we have understood (...) that the truth is something that is made more than be discover. What is true on that affirmation is, precisely, that the 'languages' are made, not discover, and the truth is a property of linguistic entities, of propositions (Rorty, 1991: 27)

This argument is the reaction to postures like has Terry Eagleton, who from other philosophic perspective says something against Rorty is fighting, and is guess an order, a natural essence intrinsic of the things:

When the science see the world, what its know is an impersonal space of causes and processes very independent of the subject and worrying indifferent to the value. But the fact that we usually can know the world, although how terrible can be the discovers that we made, it must be presuppose that it exist some kind of fundamental harmony between us and he (Eagleton, 2006: 126)

Perhaps the fundamental problem of philosophy [of language] is putting things in dichotomies and antinomy, or synthesizing excluded, that left out many things that are important:

Thus the fighting between romanticism and moral-ism, between idealism and realism continue to the extent we think there is hope to find him a sense of whether a given language is 'appropriate' for a task: to the task of adequately express the nature of the human species or to the task of representing its own way the structure of non-human reality (Rorty, 1991: 31)

The attempt, therefore, by Van Dijk of founding a science of the text is valuable if it is assumed as the overcoming of ideological struggles on particular subjects and who have to try, but it is problematic if one thinks, and with good reason-that the science is which can be applied to all areas of human life and refers only to how we understand the world through language. Set basic theoretical assumption human language as a science and the world as a text to interpret may be valid provided there is a direct reference to human experience, otherwise, set meta (and their respective meta) is to give the language more power than they should have.

Indeed, if we referred to the former was to show how they regarded the language an object of study in itself but a tool which we use and give a specific use. This usage is that reflection should fall, which means the study of categories, methods, semantic structures, and applies to meta, but we must warn the danger involved: a misuse of the categories of analysis that end unreferenced. Language is the sedimentation of human experience, why ask about the language we use to refer to the language on which we sediment our experience? Is not this a depletion of concepts and the experience itself, as it senses the possibility of falling into a reductio ad absurdum? What if we lose sight of the practical horizon of the knowledge questions, the reference point, the world that gives rise to such thoughts ...?

Literature.

Platón. Crátilo. Edición en línea disponible en:http://www.acropolis.org.uy/Investiga_y_Comparte/Biblioteca_Virtual/Platon/Platon%20-%20Cratilo.pdf

Aristóteles. Sobre la interpretación. Edición en línea disponible en:http://www.philosophia.cl/biblioteca/aristoteles/Arist%F3teles%20-%20Sobre%20la%20interpretaci%F3n.pdf

San Agustín (1947) El maestro. B.A.C, Madrid.

Eagleton, T. (2006) La estética como ideología. Editorial Trotta.

Rorty, R. (1991) Contingencia, ironía y solidaridad. Paidós.

Van Dijk, Teun A. (1983) La ciencia del texto. Paidós.