miércoles, 25 de abril de 2012

What is our role in this matter?

"And here I am waiting ...
with the same old suit yesterday,
making counts and memory
by examination,
keenly scrutinizing my life ... "León Felipe

I
It says -although there are few grounds for this- that when Yuri Gagarin left Earth on the shuttle said: "I went out and did not see God." Of course, compared to a simple statement of far-reaching and the least you can ask yourself is what did expect to see? A bearded gentleman, great? A human figure? What the fuck was expecting to see? Whether the Russian Gagarin said it or not, what matters is that the question about the location of God (where is God?) Is counter-question what is God? What do you mean by God? Who is God ...?

With this, all that can be sustained is that God is a discussion topic and a theological argument and conceptual (hence Nietzsche for example, when referring to God, adds "...and theologically speaking," that is, as a concept. See an example of what I say in the preface to the second edition of Human All Too Human.) Now, it is lawful to state that a figure like the "believer", as is the question in Jean Amery's book Beyond guilt and atonement represents strength, faith and look to the future. This "look ahead" is possible only to the extent that, regardless of what is God, the believer is not to argue how it will be, but presupposes its existence and, in particular cases (Jews in Auschwitz) is expected revenge.

Expect revenge is euphemistically translated by the Judeo-Christian tradition, the term "divine justice". God is fair, God is good ... God is love! These are all categories which are given from the "human knowledge" (Kant would say they are judgments of reason and therefore inapplicable to God, for he encompasses and exceeds the limits of reason.) Assuming that the issue of languages and translations was overcome (as problematic and stressful in philosophy), what is lawful for us to tell as knowers ...? Has any one seen God? Is there anyone that have talked to Him? (Delete from my question to Thomas Aquinas, Augustine of Hippo and everything that smacks of holiness.)

With all this, the question that we deploy is the justification of the questions that Estragon and Vladimir, characters in the play Waiting For Godot of Samuel Beckett. All they ask we won't do reproduce here. Simply, we will just say that their questions show that they unknown Godot totally, have not seen it, do not know how or when it will come.

II
Why Beckett puts a tree as the only element in his work? Turning away from minimalism and "poor theater" which suggests the text is a biblical interpretation of the subject, because the mention of Bible in the first act, for the tree and the relationship with paradise, but also because they wait for Godot on Saturday, which is the day when, according to the Bible, man was created:

"ESTRAGON: Are you sure it was tonight?
VLADIMIR: What?
ESTRAGON: If we had to wait
VLADIMIR: He said Saturday (Pause.) I think.
ESTRAGON: After work
VLADIMIR: I should point it. (Record in their pockets, filled with all kinds of junk.) "

However, philosophers, always fearing the simple, try to interpret beyond reality (by the way of the text named above, beyond guilt and atonement). "If it be that Beckett would be so obvious?" is a question that would usually be made by those who submit texts to interpretation. We do not want to interpret, and this has a good foundation. The dialogues between the characters are what we have agreed to call "absurd." We address this issue carefully and think what is absurd? What is nonsense?

To say that something makes sense is to get into a philosophical problem. What makes sense? From Auschwitz, can hardly be said that something makes sense rational. Sinn in German, Sense in English and meaning in Spanish. In any case, the concept refers to other concepts, and one may be inclined. The sense is leaning towards something. When something is contradicted to itself (can not be otherwise) is not a nonsense, but it is a contradiction, ie, going in different directions, comes and goes at the same time. All this is visible to one eye can perceive these questions: reason. The reason is the one thing (and do not know if Heidegger would agree with me in saying that the reason is a thing, I think so, but if not, who cares ...?) able to perceive a contradiction and therefore a sense, a tilt [1]. So, will the world make sense? (Again because Heidegger said that the sense of the world was given by humans.) Can not be said that the dialogues of the characters in Beckett are absurd simply because of lack of space-time continuum (answer questions with things that seem to answers to other questions). Rather, the question is what we expect to see, and what direction we hope to find?

III
While Vladimir and Estragon are waiting for Godot, we expect to make sense of the work. Could it be that Beckett is taking us for fools...? Naturally, if I ask like this, someone will tell me "and could it be that you should get out of studying philosophy"? Or "could it be that you should take his arguments seriously"? Yes, certainly. I defend myself with words of Vladimir, "not even one dares to laugh."

Of course, returning to the sense and nonsense, the latter being visible to reason, one can wonder whether there is meaning. Otherwise, if no, do we expect it?, Do we expect to find it? After all, Godot is just a name, a name that stands for something, a name that is a game that sometimes metaphorical, in the real world, it is exhausting to play. Godot is the name of something lacking, but a name that, linguistically, is the subject that accompanies an action. Now the action (hopefully) can be run independently of the subject, as this is not the run. That justifies the words of Vladimir: "To Godot? ¿Tied to Godot? What an idea! No way! "

What we try to argue is that no matter who or what is Godot. What matters is the wait. It does not matter who or what is expected, but why are you waiting for? When Albert Camus says life is absurd, I have asked what direction he would expect to find? And when he says that suicide would be a rational, I ask, why he did not do that?, Why he do not take that way-out? He would had his reasons, reasons that would not be rational and, contradictory or not, were reasons not rationalizable (another pitfall of language) but found the answer to it in his foreign and sensuality of the world.

IV
The proposed discussion topics are the relationship between God and the void of hope, loneliness and lack of communication, the senselessness and absurdity of existence. I have spent enough time at the nonsense and the absurd. I see no reason to say that life is absurd. All I see is that in the construction of meaning, in Heideggerian terms, men expect to see to some extent. Jean Amery, in his book, says that being an intellectual, when he entered the camp, he found, along with other intellectuals (also called men of spirit) impossible everything he saw. Later, he realized that all that his eyes saw was, indeed, possible. His thesis is that man walks imagining possible, but never passed the realm of imagination ... until what men imagine happens ... and also surprised.

Also about the sense. We imagine that there is a sense, a rational, an ideal, and when passing phenomena like Auschwitz -which would certainly have devoted many pages and articles with the aim of demonstrating that the hunt was anything but "devoid of reason"- comes the scandal , surprise, how did it happen? In fact, no sense in all of nature, provided that we know do with the proper lenses. Human reason it does is to make sense, even if it must invent, imagine, or dream: in short, justifies, but justifying the unjustifiable.

V
Whatever the arguments, the absurd, the senses, it is necessary to return to reflect the search for truth, without implying  objectify it, tyrannize it, unify it, totalize it. Need to reflect again the following question: Is it true that life is absurd, is it true that it makes no sense? And if so, what follows the discovery of this truth? For these reasons, I find no reason to talk about Beckett. His work itself is absurd (or so he tries to show), and to make sense is the task of philosophers, poets. Since the old Schopenhauer said: "the truth of man is not expressed by history but poetry. The history tells only events and is always anchored in the superficiality of the phenomenon. Poetry, however, tells him that never gets old because it never happened"

[1] From Auschwitz has had reassessed the concept of reason, rational and rationality. To that extent, when I say something rational does not make sense what I mean is that the reason is the only thing that can capture a sense, not in vain Heidegger argues that the sense of something is what one gives, and consequently reason and does not make sense of anything from Auschwitz, so it falls into nonsense and absurdity. But then to say that life is "nonsense" because it is absurd, is a contradiction if we appreciate the view of Heidegger and the construction of meaning in the world of life.

lunes, 23 de abril de 2012

What You wanted to be

"But my passion is stronger than reflection,
passion that causes the greatest
misfortunes to mortals"
Medea. Euripides


And that is the question of my essay. Does the moral pain of Raskolnikoff based on a feeling of vanity that prevents seen himself as a man great? In light of this, I clarify that by "moral pain" we are dealing with a nietzschean morality, seeking that the subject is free and be his own master and slave himself. On the other hand, the issue of vanity is treated from its division of the "geniuses" and "mediocre men" who, Raskolnikoff eyes are the majority.

Nietzsche says that the human body is a lot of nerves and muscles, in short, nothing beautiful to see. But what beautifies the body is the skin, which makes us a picture bearable. It is also for the soul of vanity: vanity is the skin of the soul. Such is the argument.

Assuming that the book Crime and punishment is a kind of psychopathology story of a murderer who ends up being defeated by itself and guilt rather than by the authorities, we face a fundamental question: Why does he regret? But Raskolnikoff never regret having killed. In fact he is agree that if he'd saw the old lender would kill her again. So what is pain? Why suffer from a kind of paranoia after the murder? At first glance, one can assume that paranoia would be a normal reaction, almost chemical, of having committed a crime, no a vulgar offense, but a serious one that weighs and relates directly to consciousness, to that hidden place that is never seen but always is talking and judging. Raskolnikoff is an imitation of the nietzschean superman as having its own value system, and judges the world from there. Why blame if no one is judging him?

Indeed, no one judges, but also Nietzsche's thesis can be read from the other side. That is, as I build my own values, I also must give an account before me of my own actions. In short, what is self-determination Nietzsche proposes that humans should have to live. So Raskolnikoff. He has his idea, lives by it, wants to become great. Full details of the story are certainly a trivial matter while the bottom line is precisely the act of murder and the subsequent reaction Raskolnikoff, the response to stimulation caused by his own act. It is judging himself from two places: first, for killing, and second, by the pervasive feeling that after killing. Let alone remorse, nor the fault. It just takes awareness that is buckling under pressure and is what to avoid. He convinces himself that a thousand ways he has done is fine, but your body is reacting badly. That's the drawback, that is the crux of the matter.

But how is this possible? If we stop in literary theory and we use Bakhtin's works about Dostoevsky, Bakhtin asked him and he responds as follows: "We're not looking for who is the hero, but how to recognize, and our artistic vision and does not face the reality, but the pure function of recognition of this reality for him "[1]. Why say this? Because crime and punishment, do not forget that serves Raskolnikoff be the protagonist, but not just any player. Raskolnikoff is the hero, the hero realistically, a hero who differs from the classical concept of hero (a subject representing the ideals of a community) to move to be a more simple, more humble, a hero who has characteristics that Mikhail Bakhtin explained very well. For example, "The hero of Dostoevsky's all self-consciousness" [2] and hence, the hero builds his world as his reflection. Or this one: "In Dostoevsky does not care what the hero represents to the world, but above all, what is the world to him and what comes to be for himself." [3] And all these definitions apply hero in Dostoevsky, of course, Raskolnikoff. And all the latter are subsumed by Bakhtin said: "That which must be represented becomes the last count of conscience and self-awareness and, after all, his last word about yourself and your world" [4 ] That is, in Dostoevsky's heroes have the final say as to its vision of world and of themselves, therefore, there is nothing to add to the heroes that they do not know Dostoevskian. Such is the Bakhtinian argument.

But back to Raskolnikoff, which is in Siberia (or was I do not know if it came out) paying for his crime. One may ask: if he does not regret having committed the crime, can be some kind of forgiveness? In short, what he is not forgiven is precisely not to become a great and stately man who wanted to be. His pride does not give even a chance to be forgiven for not being able to achieve the objective. The most that do justice for him is "pay off your debt," but then forgiveness is a huge difference. Who will forgive him? And how will you forgive him if he does not repent? This is where Sonia

What is Sonia? She is also unfortunate, is a prostitute rather than the profession is a woman prostituted by the situation. It's different. Now, since it so, that fact must have a meaning: that she is low class and yet love is both unfortunate, downtrodden subjects between themselves and their miserable situation. She is the one who forgives, she is the one who reads the passage of Lazarus and invites him to the resurrection, it is what convinces him ultimately delivered. Raskolnikoff wanted to flee, and the question "where" he sees that his idea is stupid, not what should happen. You do not have to answer more than "anywhere, far, far away", but without any specific location. She argues that it can not live on the run, and follows an argumentative tirade in which Raskolnikoff is lost, and she makes it look: "I missed you," he says.

The only way left is to give, and it is Sonia who makes him see this. But even before Sonia Raskolnikoff we have a proud, arrogant, which simply responds reluctantly to what is asked, to what is said. He is furious, angry, discharge their anger with others, perhaps because of his clumsiness, perhaps because of his lack of strength to not be great, not to be Napoleon. Ivan Karamazov is like this: an intellectual who understands the world and interprets it from an original vision. But the interpretation of the implementation there is a jump, one of those leaps that often can not afford. Easier said than than done, and so happens to Raskolnikoff. His idea was never kill to steal his idea was that if I could prove, that if I could be what he wanted. Finally, after all, was this the intention, hence the division of men. And the problem is not that he feels entitled to kill, or good, this is part of another problem and another trial. The problem here is that it is precisely this: If it was so clear, what went wrong? And their pain is not repentance [5], their pain is by failure. Raskolnikoff not what I wanted to be. Failed, and therein lies the moral problem (Nietzsche and Dostoevsky's moral, for that matter). His judgment is himself, and can not escape to say "shit, I failed". There is no way to escape from himself, so the claim is absolutely appropriate Bakhtin and heartbreaking, "there is nothing to add to Dostoevskian heroes they do not know."

Now, let us separate cause from effect. The effect is that Raskolnikoff killed, but the cause becomes the motivation. What do you want to be a Napoleon? What do you get one with be great? What is the purpose of this? After all, the genius by the genius does not exist. It is an ideal. It is therefore something further away. Raskolnikoff wants to be great, great, super man, call it what you want, but the point is the same: to highlight. Leaving the vast majority of poor who live and swarm in the world. For what purpose? The admiration, vanity. What must be determined is whether it requires self-admiration (and prove to yourself that you are capable of a certain action, such as killing, in this case) or whether it also requires admiration of others, of that mass so criticized and beaten by the superior man, for Raskolnikoff, in our case.

The last thing we can discard when you consider Bakhtin again with the following: "the hero has an ideological authority is independent and is perceived as an ideological author of its own, and not as an object of Dostoevsky's artistic vision" [6 ]. Consequently, Raskolnikoff is an independent entity even its creator, so he does not care if Dostoevsky agrees with him, much less you to import other (although this does not mean that his act is reckless as put the item in the beginning. In this case, the heading is set to be denied).

Raskolnikoff is what is (up to a murderer), but not rash. In fact all his self-consciousness is simply the process of reflection and constant meditation on what to do and what happens next, this projection that seeks to explain that things are controlled by it. But be persistent and can not say that. And that of trashes his pride and vanity, and with them, ultimately, it destroys morale. Why? Because your table of values ??did not work, because it could not implement it because it has failed in his attempt, for his idea could not be carried out. In short, it is fair to say Raskolnikoff this (and I hope he do not bother because the familiarity): you could not be what you wanted to be. And the pain is not able, not to get the will to power of Nietzsche, in not being able. And not being trained, how can there be self-assessment?, Where does the vanity?, Where is the pride? But all this is possible talking about morality itself, because in a broad sense, he never repents the murder. After all, it would be, and all this discussion is even before the emergence of Sonia and delivery. What does this end? Why Raskolnikoff, like Lazarus, to revive? This question is in the air, but is solid. Of course, it is worth clarifying: vanity, my favorite sin ...

[1] Bajtín, M (2003). Problemas de la poética de Dostoievski. Ciudad de México: Fondo de cultura económica P. 75

[2] Ibíd. P 79
[3] Ibíd. P. 73
[4] Ibíd.P74
[5] In this senses there isn't "moral pain" in a traditional sense.
[6] Ibíd. P.13

Analysis of Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov


Who approach the literature of Dostoevsky can see that he is master of psychology, and psychopathology, and often are not mistaken in this judgment. Nietzsche, for example, claims in Dostoevsky see a psychologist (besides being the only psychologist from which one could learn something, as the German philosopher said in the twilight of the idols), a perfect man who can show human behavior to perfection and link them to the moral issue, which is the subject matter of the author.

His work, The Brothers Karamazov, is no exception to this subject, nor beyond the psychological development of characters separately. The center of the book, the Karamazov family and his father. The two wives of the father have no weight here, since the man is a lewd did not respect the basic rules of marriage, his two wives left him, the first for another man, and the second by a disease. ¿Topics of the book? Well, this is different. Can one say ten thousand things about the book on Dostoevsky, even integers can be drawn interpretive studies of key passages as "a double-edged sword" or "Grand Inquisitor" (which can arouse so much controversy). But the underlying theme is one-disguised-divided into two themes: moral and God. In the end, if you ask wisely what Dostoevsky meant this book so great? can you answer that it is an attempt to answer a question that would be something like: how can a man fail to justify their moral in God and turn from their own regulatory body? And this question is the key to reading the book.

What is the teaching of the book? Dostoevsky himself says he does not know if you can prove it's worth reading the book. "For me, Fiodorovich Alexei is a remarkable man, but I doubt strongly that show the reader achieve" (p. 69). Alexei is the hero, a hero rare, shy, quiet, no action (the youngest brother). The hero of Dostoevsky, that is, an ordinary man. A Alexei also applied Dostoyevsky's definition of realism: "There are miracles that lean towards the realistic faith. The true realist, if not a believer, you will always find itself strength and ability to believe or not in the miracle, and if it is presented as an indisputable fact, the unbeliever will prefer not to believe his senses to admit the fact. (...) In the realist faith is not born of miracle but the miracle born of faith "(p. 100). So, with the key to understanding and Alexei as a hero, what are your brothers?, What does your father?, What does the father Zosima? These fundamental questions are very complicated to answer given the length of the book, but be brief.

Dmitri Karamazov, the eldest brother, the defendant at the end of the book to be a parricide, a strange, incontinent with his passions, would do anything for love, Grushenka, and that "would do anything" for course includes the act of murder. Ivan Karamazov is somewhat like the dreaded atheist intellectual by modernity. A guy with an above-average intelligence, with an innate ability to study, which automatically makes him an atheist (in the eyes of believers). In the book, he created the poem entitled "The Grand Inquisitor", which is a whole chapter of the book masterfully conducted on morality and freedom as the ultimate end of human existence. In sum, the free man does not know what to do with their freedom, and so the delivery. Thus says the Grand Inquisitor, a good guy and teacher, son of the strange adventures of Ivan Karamazov intellectuals.

Fyodor Pavlovich Karamazov. Which I put to define it is unnecessary and unjust, Dostoyevsky makes it better because, in short, gives a vague idea that ends up not being so vague at the beginning of the first chapter of the book, and defines it thus: "Was the type of man not only vile and dissolute, but at the same time, awkward, clumsy though those who know how to compose a charm of their business interests, and only apparently such matters (...) most of these fools are quite intelligent and cunning (p. 75). Then he says Fyodor Dostoevsky gift is what we call today a "live", a "bee", which slices out of business with trickery (the latter itself is said by the Russian).
Father Zosima: This is the time it did not explain why the father had a whole section of the book (more specifically around the sixth book) to campaign on moral issues. A section of the book that, actually, if you skip it, nothing happens in history. But Dostoevsky leaving teaching there on a better humanity are not negligible and, for that alone, is worth reading the sixth book. While there they will find nothing of the Karamazov, but a moral construction very educational for life.

These, which are the main characters, revolving around Alexei. God is a foundation of morality, but is also challenged by this terrible world and away from God represented by his brothers and father. Thus speaks the little Ivan Alexei: "... I believe in order, within the meaning of life, believe in eternal harmony (...) in the Word who is God and is God himself, and so forth and so on until the infinity (...). However, imagine that the end result I do not accept this world of God, and although I know it exists, do not accept in any way. Understand me, it is God whom rejection, but the world, the world created by Him (p. 384). Also, his father, with a ridiculous argument that thought, says that in hell there are hooks in the ceiling to make sinners suffer for all eternity, or at least that the church intends, and drop the following: "Well If there is no ceiling hooks, everyone scurries over and over is incredible: who is going to crawl, then, with hooks? Because if I do not drag me, what would happen?, Where is the justice in the world? Il faudrait inventer them ... "(P. 99). And Dmitri, is simply an incontinent who believes in God but does not know how to act correctly and just follow your momentary impulse (whether its impulse tells you to kill his father).

To counter this negative effect of God is Father Zosima and monastery, practicing in Alexei respect for the divine. However, when the father dies, Alexei felt that killed his faith in God, he begins to realize that he has denied the existence of a supreme being much more than I thought and said "I do not accept God but their world," adding to the argument his brother Ivan.

I accept God but do not accept His world
This statement is made by Ivan, but retaken by Alexei day of the funeral of the father. What can it mean that non-acceptance of the world? It may be an attempt to self-determine the man as subject to the world. But certainly this is reflected in who most strongly is Ivan, who in a discussion with himself (literally with an alter ego who is represented by a kind of demon) argues that, or rather, the devil says this: "Je pense , donc je suis, this I know for a fact, whereas everything else, everything around me, all these worlds, God and even Satan himself, all for me is unproven, there is no evidence that it exists in yes or emanation is just mine, a progressive development of my self, with sole and eternal life ... "(P. 932). Although, of course, concern is widespread. Each character shows that some uncertainty in different ways. Even Father Zosima, when making their confessions to Augustine, God recognized not recognize at first. After that Alexis ends up taking the same position and, indeed, does not acknowledge God. Ends up taking a position similar to that of his brother Ivan, that is, a type of submission on God as the subject but definitely a denial of the world he has created for man. Here is an abysmal distance. Distance is not saved in any way and, therefore, ends in an absurd leap under way Kierkegaard, a leap to believe God or not believe him jump and stop him and his world.

Dostoevsky's warning is accurate. Alexei is who plays all the drama, all the moral dilemma is in the light of this hero who can light up the book and display all the moral issue in terms of man with God and man without God, for this is precisely transit through which passes this character happens to believe to doubt, goes from strength to certainty. All that is solid melts into air, can be applied to Alexei. And then if you do not see God, how to determine the actions?, Under what criteria? Here's the rub.

Moreover, his brother Dmitri ends up going to jail under which is the most obvious culprit of the murder of Fyodor Pavlovich, but Dmitri is innocent. Just a victim, not of justice but on the circumstances (Kafkaesque language, had its process). And it would still be unfair to him to go to jail. How to accept a world? Dmitri accepts the penalty under that feels a renewed man, something like a Raskolnikoff, but Alexei, why would I take on this? He is the hero, and as such this submission does not fit as well. Bakhtin say that "the hero has an ideological authority is independent and is perceived as an ideological author of its own and not as objects of Dostoevsky's artistic vision" (M. Bakhtin. P. 13). Thus, Alexei is subjected to the fact that his brother is in jail, but he firmly believes in the innocence of it. In this "believe in his innocence" lies the strength of Bakhtinian argument that allowing the hero Dostoevsky is not subject to any ideology (and to be precise, in this case, no belief). So Alexis is the hero but is he who has more action in the play. It is in him who turns the moral drama.

Now, what Dostoevsky called one of the final chapters of the book "a miscarriage of justice" which is where Dmitri Karamazov condemn parricide for the crime of (crime he did not commit but I had every intention of doing so) seems to be the Kafkaesque process . A false accusation and a real court. The process takes from Mitya (another name Dmitri) is not as unfair as that is done against Joseph K ... but they are both applicable that "justice means nothing to you, you take when you come and leave when you leave. " Thus, justice is not in the world, is in men, and if so, why ask God for justice?, Why ask for changes in humanity? And all this can be express with relation to freedom, that freedom has not humans because they do not know what to do with it, because the donation shall consume itself.

But what can make a wrongful conviction and, in a sense, an impotence to the world? I do not accept. Alexei, Ivan, Dmitri, even his own father, Fyodor, do not accept that God made the world but they try to do it their way. Fyodor Pavlovich from the hedonism and sensuality that borders on the pathetic, Dmitri from Aristotelian incontinence (abused too much of their impulses and nothing seems no reason), Ivan is the intellectual and building a better world from the beginning based on reasonable a type of utilitarianism and Alexis has to deal with all this world dissociated and alien to each other, living so close and not understood and not understood. In short, the book is a little universe that leaves a moral one large and many small morals. The big lesson is this: it requires a radical moral change. It is pointless for humans surrender their moral God and stay with reason, because that will trigger in dire consequences for all humanity. We must talk about a change in society which can only happen through a moral change. The problem remains the same: "... because without God, how can there be crime?" (Dostoievski. P. 492) In other words, how to incite a change in human behavior without resorting to crime, punishment ? This is best reflected in the work of Russian of the same name, Crime and punishment, where punishment is not exactly a punishment (if ultimately pay) but a moral pain. How can these changes in behavior? Perhaps because of this concern was Dostoevsky psychologist, to force to resolve these issues. And the brothers, the concern is the same. Whether God exists or not, the matter is to improve the world, save him from poverty, selfishness and a lot of similar services. How do, how Dostoevsky answers to this question proposed in siblings and in general in all his work? Not explicitly stated in this work, it is true, but can be sensed, and the Russian response, the synthesis of all his thought is this: beauty will save the world.
 
Literature
    Dostoevsky, M. (2008). The Brothers Karamazov. Madrid: Universal Lyrics
    Bakhtin, M (2003). Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
    Kafka, F. (1976). The process. Buenos Aires: Losada.


Those who not support more they gone

"How are strung merit and glory
never occurs to fools, 
if they had the Philosopher's Stone
there would not be philosopher for the stone."
Faust. Goethe


If we assume that reflects the inability to understand Werther while none of us committed suicide, we start with a basic difficulty. Perhaps it requires subtlety and tact to address these issues with delicacy, without falling into technicalities that hardly leave room for feelings. Now it is true that this has to be a technical test where I show my skills when speaking of the main topics of romanticism in literature and especially the skill with which Goethe, with his alter ego Werther [1], shows these issues. What can you do there? Well what a serious, mature test: ask a question, problematized if necessary (this is to require concepts; working philosopher) and developed with the tools you have on hand. My question, if you would do it, will look for the cause of the suicide of Werther as well: What are the reasons that lead to Werther to suicide? And not to miss along the way, I assume two hypotheses as true, leaving out many other things: the first is to commit suicide by not having to Charlotte and all the suffering it entails, the second is that Werther commits suicide by insecurity, and the fact of not having to Charlotte works as a trigger, like the drop that overflows the cup and takes it to its destination. Although it is a question too complicated and I am aware that I'm exposed to much criticism, what can be done without exposure? One can hardly achieve anything without some degree of danger, and as this is not so bad, I can risk it and skate with ease. The elements that I want to take to resolve this are excerpts from the book, I can help clarify my point.

Werther, a man incomprehensible for himself, capable of understanding the world and incapable of being understood by it. Werther, a man as anyone and yet so unlike anything that the earth has seen, Werther, a man far superior, with a passion and a burning in the heart that prevent stopping at their feelings, their impulses. This is what makes it different, as most men know their passions and contain under that are dominated by a moral, moral marking their actions in view to act in good or bad way. So, keep their passions when they are "bad" the mask, while Werther has no problem as it is displayed. The only thing is his pain hidden, and hidden from the person who causes it, not hurt, but not a martyr. Nietzsche says that "when we love, we want our failures are hidden, but not for vanity, but do not suffer for the beloved. In fact, the lover would like to look divine, and this not from vanity "[2], and perhaps this is Werther. All his vanity and selfishness are blurred in the presence of Charlotte, in whom is completely diminished, and his vanity lies in pleasing her, her vanity lies in not doing anything that causes discomfort, not to make her suffer, in being nice to her in this view that Nietzsche speaks divine.

What does Werther see in Charlotte? An illusion. But an illusion that is doomed to be unsuccessful, not only because she is committed and then go to marry, but because of the untimely nature of Werther. It is not that Charlotte can not be yours, is he can not indulge their passions for the reasons already mentioned, that is, not to offend, not to displease him, and he is always doubting that she feels the same him because I knew it, would throw all the devil and pounce on it, take in his arms and kisses fill of (words of Werther). But it can not be sure that she, even when committed, feel the passion that he feels. Then you can ask yourself the question, insecurity, it is precisely by Carlota, or just a sign of insecurity Werther himself, he can not trust your instincts?

"Ah, man is so versatile in nature, even where security has to be appreciated in something, even where it can leave a deep memory of their existence or changes in memory and soul of those who you are loved, even if there is to die and disappear, and this, alas, too soon. "What is reflected here?, that Werther is insecure, wondering many things, questions God for answers, but gives up easily knows that God will not answer anything, I know in advance. He asks quiet, but knows that God can not tell, He will not give anything by his own hand. He says two things about it, thus: "I left her and ... My God, you who see my suffering, you must stop them. "And this one:" And I'm bored with my superior and my knowledge. You, sir, you have given me these goods, why not denied me by granting me half of them, however, confidence and satisfaction in myself? "Asks Werther himself. You feel so alone, unable to trust himself, and says that "loneliness is the most pernicious" in such a way that these things lead him to not have a floor which tread. This apart from nature, which is perhaps the only soil that is able to tread with ease and confidence.

Where do Werther's insecurities? You see, I dismissed beforehand the possibility of suicide by Carlota only, and have done so precisely because that way the book tells me. The condition that Goethe intended to show part of the way to be burning itself (ie Werther), and Charlotte works as an excuse in this case. So Werther's insecurities about himself and the world are founded in God is he to blame for the pain of Werther, and it is because not only has refused to Charlotte, but it has not given the tools to be provided to own happiness and tranquility so desired, or access to Charlotte, who would be the last degree of happiness.

"Ah! Why I am not one of those dummies that adapt to everything, everything except themselves? So at least the bottom of my unbearable desolation would not weigh on me more than half. Unfortunately, I understand that the fault is solely mine. Guilt ". This only shows us various elements that make the life of Werther heavy guilt, which is reflected in the above passage, the knowledge of the pain of existence that we find in it the following: "Only God knows how many times I've slept with desire and hope never wake up. The next day I open my eyes, I see again the sun again and feel the weight of my existence. " Werther is unsafe, yes, but there is a guilty party himself and God.

All this is in relation to Werther and his thoughts, the monologue that is reflected throughout the day. But if we go further, I quote Camus and the myth of Sisyphus. In that book, Camus starts by stating that the only question you need to do philosophy is the meaning of life. His argument: there are men like Galileo who are not willing to die for their ideas, even when considered as the truth, unless those ideas give meaning to life and, therefore, be valid to make sense of the Death.

That is, the meaning of life works both ways: first, giving the will to live, and why, if missing, then automatically confer the sense of dying. Why live if you do not have to Charlotte?, Might be a question worthy of making Werther. But if we take the argument further, we might well ask: Does it make sense life without Charlotte? Because one thing is the conditions that end up being somewhat bearable, even in difficult conditions, but is it necessary to live suffering? This is the question that Nietzsche and here is the fundamental dilemma.

Nor can it be said that Werther would flee to pain, and that his suicide is just a cowardly way out. First of all there is coward, nor is moving away much of his pain as he knows, one way or another, to kill his beloved hurt. Just read the farewell letter which states that "eternal union" not to destroy ever (referring to the only kiss that could give it), and his death ensures that impossibility. What is Werther's suicide?, Why decides to commit suicide?, Why can not carry the burden that has been carrying? What things go through your mind? Is it a desperate act of love? And when we ask these questions, which, strictly speaking, are seen from one question-is plenty of options when you understand the statement that "Werther did not understand if we do not commit suicide."

Because of this, is that my argument is that Werther suffers pain that I call it insecurity. The only security you have are your feelings, even claiming their security as well: "Sometimes I do not understand how you can love another man, how dare you love another man when I love a love so perfect, so deep, so vast, when I know more than her, and see nothing but her, and I think more than her. " So does your security but insecurity speaks thus: "It's up to scratch and break the head considering how little we value each other. Alas! Nobody will give me the love, joy, joy of joys that I feel inside me. And even if he had a heart full of the sweetest feelings, I could not make happy in hers who lacked it. "

Indeed, as stated at the beginning of the text, it is very difficult to talk about these issues when dealing with "above" with objectivities which could hardly be closer to reality, in this case, one can hardly get close to people's hearts. But ignoring that for this work will begin with the fact that suicide is never the "other." That is, when someone commits suicide (or suicidal thoughts) is because there is nothing to tie it to the world, and maybe that's why the suicide a step to freedom, or action that can be freer. For works like Werther, his death is not caused by Carlota, and he, as a lover, would be unable to blame her. If we read carefully, he dares to blame anything and anyone in their suffering (such as God, it ends up being solely responsible for your pain), but never blame her, I could not see it as the cause of its evils, or at least not in a negative sense. He knows she is the cause of his pain at not having it, by absence, but not for herself, not because it hurt him: precisely what hurts is not having it!

"Why should I not confess my distress at this point in my being trembles, fluctuating between life and death, in which the past is projected as a flash in the dark abyss of the future, when everything around me collapses and the world seems to finish me? "Here is the weight of the statement of the anguish felt by Werther, and the fact that it reflects a more anguish to conceive the world apart from those mentioned so far as follows: "I often say to myself: Your destination is the same: compared to you, other men are happy, because he never was troubled mortal like you. Then I read any ancient poet and I think that is the book my own heart. What! Still I have much left to suffer? And before that I have been men so unhappy? "That is, their status as romantic as it is he the only one who suffers and suffers as do the great men, while men" normal "content and reach to happiness, as inaccessible to the Romantics, so incomprehensible to Werther.

Happiness is elusive, but Charlotte is the absence of which makes it suicide? That lack, the lack of possession of the loved one will be as much, for this case, the trigger for action. Even psychology states that a suicide does not become suicidal, but is born with that tendency. Our hero is very sensitive to the insensitivity of the world or, as the Romantics, the world does not understand and that causes pain. But it can not be said for Charlotte to Werther commits suicide, even the latter would not allow that. If you pay attention, can be found in Werther that their sufferings come from a misunderstanding of all: do not understand why he can not be with Charlotte, and neither can understand why she is in love with another, and this one, still good, not own merits in the opinion of Werther. That is perhaps what gives more rage, that his opponent is a good man, even considered better than himself. And all this misunderstanding, adding that questions why God has arranged things so and not otherwise, another where he can be happy, as are the others (who do not understand why they are happy) with all these questions, I suspect that what is here is an insecurity, and very strong. There is a loneliness, and asks himself why suffer if I'm so good?

The only one capable of listening is William, the only one who listens intently to every movement. But Werther there is nothing that offers security and is therefore thrown into the suicide: "My God, my God! Why have you forsaken me? What shame this has given me cry? And I fear it is time to escape in my mouth, when he escaped from the life of one who, son of heaven, has been involved in them like a shroud? "

It's not just Charlotte, is that there is nothing that belongs here. And his anxiety is precisely the fact that you no longer see the meaning of life is no longer necessary to live suffering. Carlota not be with him, not even God would make you happier (one way or another the only debt that God is with him is not doing so can easily be delivered to happiness), or have anything to fight for. Werther is lost, insecure, and if you like, trapped. Suicide is a way out, but as the removal, is also an entry: access through that door, but to happiness, at least the end of his condition, we could interpret it as its peace and quiet. The question that remains unanswered is whether suicide can be considered as an attempt to provide for yourself security, if it is an affirmation of existence, or whether it is a response to God. However, there is anguish before the suicide, after him, freedom and tranquility. Ultimately, Werther not take any more and left ...

"Why do I wake up, embalmed breath of spring? You touch me and tell me: I bring with me the dew of heaven, but soon I will be withered, because soon the storm will pluck my leaves. Tomorrow will 
the traveler will come to know me in my beauty, I seek your views about him, I seek and I find it. "

---------------------------------------------------------------
Notes.
[1] He called his alter ego precisely because of the resemblance to Goethe himself, to the point that we can not define who is and who is Goethe's Werther. I say this from what is mentioned in class about the Romantic hero: the protagonist is a self-projection of the author.
[2] The Gay Science. Frederick Nietzsche

About ascetic ideals


"Unconcerned, ironic, violent
like that wisdom want us: is a woman,
always loves only a warrior ... "
Thus Spoke Zarathustra
 
"Man prefers to want the nothing instead of don't want"
Genealogy of Morals.

Introduction
This essay is about the third treatise of the Genealogy of Morals by Frederick Nietzsche, what ascetic ideals mean? There will be a big effort of interpretation and evaluation of the treaty (two concepts that cross the Nietzschean philosophy) taking into account two aphorisms that Nietzsche used for this treaty (the same as those at the beginning of this text). The first is taken from Zarathustra and is set as initial section of the treaty, the second is "the preferred human to want to not want anything" statement starts and closes the third treatise. The questions try to answer are: what is the split between the philosopher and the priest in relation to the ascetic ideal? What is the "will to nothingness"? and finally, how you miss the vitality of nihilism? These are big questions, and therefore, we quote the definitions of entry-not-giving explanations of the meaning of Nietzsche's ascetic ideals in general in an aphorism of the treaty. Let us begin from the beginning.

I
"What do ascetic ideals? - Among artists, nothing or too many different things, between philosophers and learned men, something like a nose and an instinct to perceive the most favorable conditions of high spirituality, among women, at best, a kindness more than seduction morbidezza some meat on a beautiful, beautiful animal blessedness a thick, between disabled people and altered physiologically (most deadly), an attempt to be "too good" for this world, a holy form of debauchery , its main resource in the fight against pain and slow against boredom, among priests, the genuine priestly faith, their best instrument of power, and also the "supreme" authority for the same, finally, between saints, a pretext for winter dormancy, its Novissima gloriae cupid, rest in nothingness ("God"), its peculiar form of madness. However, in the fact that the ascetic ideal has meant so much to the man expresses the fundamental reality of the human will, its horror vacui: this will need a goal - and prefers to want the nothing instead of don't want" (Nietzsche. First paragraph of the third part of Genealogy of moral

II
What is the split of the philosopher and the priest in relation to the ascetic ideal? A short answer might be this: the philosopher pays homage to the ascetic ideal because "he wants to escape to torture" (Nietzsche 2006, 137) while the priest is not interested in escape such torture seems rather that it is justified . But let us examine this issue carefully.

Philosopher Nietzsche places the ascetic ideal as the latter is the budget for the first, ie, the philosopher must represent an asceticism to be possible. But why should it? According to the German philosopher, for lack of strength given its predisposition to contemplation. Consequently, the philosopher is a contemplative man, but why deny the world?, Why deny the senses? What is the love of the wilderness, solitude, contempt ...? It seems as if the will to power was the product of those souls who, initially, doubted themselves and assert themselves in the world, to affirm its existence and self-confidence had withdrawn to a "desert either" very motivated by a "said" in life. Indeed, the ascetic ideal was initially the same for philosophers and priests, because for them it meant "something", unlike artists, namely: a love-master.

Nietzsche argues that both the philosopher and the priest, ("contemplative man") was scorned for not being afraid, and consequently had to instill fear in others and in himself to be fear and gain their "right to life" . A deconstructionist process, according to FN was used to overthrow belief in himself and inspire fear in others. Thus, removal of loneliness, withdrawal into the wilderness any FN defined as the search for optimum conditions to assert its existence. But why? The philosopher, being contemplative, must retire into the wilderness to do what others can not do, namely the scope of a higher spirituality, understanding this, the expression of strength, the will to power. Now, that does not sound like a philosopher but a priest, self flagellates also face their audience. However, the philosopher was and has been so applauded when he hears stories ascetic as stated in the text. Where were separated philosopher and priest?

The answer is found when Nietzsche says "a strong and well built man digests his experiences (including actions, misdeeds) just as he digests his meals, even if it bites hard to swallow" (Nietzsche 2006, 167). The philosopher retires to the desert to prove to himself that he is able to control his instincts, to control yourself, just as the priest. The difference lies in the impulse that motivates one to the other. Both do so thirsty for power, after all, is the will that is operating. But there's another thing: Nietzsche claims because it shifts the focus of the philosopher and the ascetic ideal is, apart from wanting to dominate, a drive for truth, or if you have very sensitive ears, a drive for nothing. It is true that claims there is "truth" as such but simply interpretations of facts is based on different interpretations of the same thing (of life) that you can have more perspectives on the same and, consequently, the philosopher seeks objectivity, their truth.

Here comes the split with the priest who certainly lacks that also drive for nothing, because motivation is the formation of the priest of his flock, his role as a nurse. Here, the priest applies the whip himself with an admirable desire, it is in front of your audience to show their strength and end up dominating the "flock". On this, Nietzsche argues that the creation of herds can only come from the "common miseries." To that extent, the progress of the community will forget the misery particular.

So, the split of the philosopher and the priest is the distance and attitude toward the ascetic ideal, as the philosopher's apparent denial that involves the ideal is transformed and becomes a yes to life, while the priest is a negation and expression of force ... but to affirm life with the conditions optimum is saying yes to life, something the priest does not make it to being sick, feeling sick, to understand the sick, change the direction of resentment of these ... and tortured, and poisoned wounds healing slowly.

III
What is the will to nothingness? Nihilism. But what will that mean anything? Can you understand how a non-want-master (you)? Nietzsche holds a claim that sounds bad for sensitive ears, namely: "What is there to fear, causing fatal effects than any other fate would not be the great fear but the great nausea compared with men, and also the large compassion for man. Assuming that one day both get marriage each other, immediately enter the world of node inevitable, something quite sinister, the "last will" of man, his will to nothingness, nihilism. And indeed, there is much more prepared for this. " (Nietzsche 2006, 158)

Fact-and a time getting out of the theory, the world has changed since World War II. The fact that men have produced an Auschwitz, a Hiroshima, meant the fall of the "rationality" and the advent of nihilism that Nietzsche announced, because life has lost all its value in these places and hence. The fatalism of culture expressed the same disappointment (disappointment can be traced to the absence of God and ultimate foundations.) Examples: Beyond guilt and atonement of Jean Amery and the play Waiting for Godot Samuel Beckett, which smacks of disappointment, to despair, to distress. But perhaps he gives greater account of this is Albert Camus in the century of fear, I quote verbatim a paragraph from that essay, which states:

"By the way, is not the first time that men are faced with a future materially closed. But out later, usually by word and cry. Resorted to other values ??on which their hopes. Today nobody talks and (except recurring) because the world seems driven by forces blind and deaf can not hear the voices of warning, advice and prayers. Something in us was destroyed by the spectacle of the years we have just experienced. And that something is that eternal confidence man who has always led to believe that another man could be obtained from human reactions speaking the language of mankind. We saw lie, degrade, kill, deport, torture, and each time this happened was impossible to persuade those who did not to, because they were sure of themselves and because they are persuaded to an abstraction, ie the representative of an ideology ".

In the words smell fatalism, the fatalism of an intellectual who warned what might happen, was able to see yet happened. Hence Nietzsche's complaint against the culture sites. The ascetic ideal philosophers and learned men means the most optimal conditions for the development of a higher spirituality, but at the time that the optimum disappears, is the void, nothingness, and therefore there is something to love. The all equal is precisely what Camus called with the following words: "The world seems driven by forces blind and deaf can not hear the voices of warning." Is there no longer want anything to ...?

IV
With this, nihilism is expressed in more general terms. Anyone hear the warnings, what Professor Carlos Fajardo Fajardo in his text Faces of totalitarianism says repeatedly: the artist does not have to talk to. Nihilism that culture is a not-will, a not-want-to. However, Nietzsche wants to get to nihilism, cries out for him in the last aphorism of the treaty when he claims to desire the human prefers to not wanting anything. In that sentence, the non-willing is vitalism, while wanting nothing, nothing is embracing nihilism reagent. What does this mean?

Indeed, the German philosopher proposed as every philosopher task of determining the hierarchy of values, reappraise. Nietzsche is not proposing to embrace anything because that is a fatalism that becomes tired, he was just representing Auschwitz. No longer trusted the man and his rationality ... but what does not-want nothing? In fact, wanting something but not wanting it, but something else. A different motivation ... Could be the drive for beauty?

Among the various philosophical, Nietzsche can be located in vitalism, as this current denies the principles and foundations first and last, is a friend of becoming and, briefly told, is proposed for doing something with life as he has. Nihilism is a liability, while vitalism is an asset. Nihilism and vitalism have lack of fundamentals, but by the same, vitalism is to want-to. It skips the love-master of the priest and want to escape torture-philosopher.

However, the question why man? is that perhaps resonates more Eco-precisely because of the emptiness that surrounds the man. In the end Nietzsche says, "that hatred against humanity, nay, against the animal, indeed, against the material, that repugnance to the senses, to reason itself, the fear of happiness and beauty, this longing to depart from all appearance, change, becoming, death, desire, longing itself - all this means, dare we understand it, a will to nothingness, an aversion to life, a rejection of the most fundamental assumptions of life, but it is, and it remains a will! "(Nietzsche: 2006, 205)

Psychologically speaking, will eliminate a task is laughable. The motivation is always existing, and the ascetic ideal expresses the strength of will with the utmost rigor. I do not think Nietzsche seeks to eliminate the will, but rather the ideal condition of the will. "Where are all perfect, I only see the human, too human."

V
So far we have tried to put the text under discussion with the three initial questions. Now let the issue. Nihilism or vitalism ¿? Beauty will save the world, said Dostoevsky. Stendhal understood the beauty and promise of happiness, and on that basis can discuss the issue. Since Nietzsche says you can not see the art work selflessly. Even Schopenhauer does, but proposes the opposite. "The soul that has been created with a predisposition to love, is thrown everything nice, as soon as is prompted by the pleasure to take action," says Dante's Divine Comedy. That "take action" is the crux of the matter. The unquestionable fact that we have no means wanting in any way, we do what we want. At first it did not matter what they wanted, says Nietzsche, but now it does matter, now we are going through life unconcerned with intent to do, to throw to the beautiful, we need action. Fresh air!, Healthy air, vitalism. Desire. The want-to.

"The ascetic ideal has a goal - and that is universal enough so that, compared with her, all other interests of human existence seem petty and narrow" (Nietzsche, 2006: 189). Thus, the clamor for vitalism, by the manifestation of life must be the question of what and why of life. How do you jump from nihilism to vitalism? It is certainly not a leap virtue of the absurd (Kierkegaard), but rather move to deny the world to say. If the ascetic ideal is a unique way of interpreting life, considering the momentum of that performance should lead to that there are other ways of interpretation and affirmation of life. No fight with asceticism, in fact admiring. At issue is how life is affirmed. For that reason is that vitalism is the force that provides the conditions for new interpretations and goals of life is the new optimum of the philosopher, his work, his drive for truth and beauty:

"Do not worry, the beauty will rejoice with his grace." Hafiz, Persian poet.


C'est pas des raisons d'homme

"Moral conscience, to which so many foolish
 have offended and many more
 have denied, is something that exists and ever existed,
 is not an invention of philosophers."
Saramago

Introduction
To put in dialogue Jankelevitch and Derrida, it is necessary to have a common theme, namely, forgiveness. Now to discuss the matter with finesse, is necessary to speak of forgiveness in one place. Jankelevitch defends a religious forgiveness by giving a sense of grace, while Derrida, trying to get away from worrying about if forgiveness is a Judeo-Christian matter proposes a forgiveness with political moral implications.
But what does it mean to forgive the unforgivable? Both authors seem to agree that the issue must have something to forgive that has not been atoned for: "For there to be forgiveness, it must be remembered that the irreparable or still present, the wound is still open" (Derrida, 2001 : 75); "Forgiveness is employed when the grievance remains unfixed, not-atone and guilt, and while the victim has not been compensated for his injury" (Jankelevitch, 1999: 18) However, what is there to forgive? Why stand on the situation of the victim and the aggressor? Is not the default one more way of aggression? The guiding question of this essay is this: if the repair calls for forgiveness of the victim-repair at the political level but must come from the State of which victims and perpetrators should be involved in apartheid-like, is it ethical to want repair the executioner?

In the second part will attempt an application of philosophy in reality, for as stated Jankelevitch: "The impulse of forgiveness is so impalpable, so controversial, that repels any analysis: what grips would be a philosophical discourse on that shock fugitive in that imperceptible flicker of charity "(Jankelevitch, 1999: 11) may be no such handles, but you may have speech application.

Forgiveness is a gift
I
In a broad sense, to speak of forgiveness involves talking to a religious tradition, more so if one considers the fact that the word "forgiveness" is not translated into many African languages, it is a word with a Judeo-Christian significance and perhaps Muslim (Derrida). Now it may be the issue if we do not talk of forgiveness but forgiveness all relative. (Jankelevitch, 1999: 11) To that extent, it is necessary to split the political forgiveness Forgiveness, more so if we start from the affirmation of self Jankelevitch to start your essay: "Forgiveness is, from this point of view, an event that never which came into being in history has an act that has no place in any part of space, a movement of the soul does not exist in current psychology "(Jankelevitch, 1999: 7).

If we look carefully, not just the little word has the same dye forgiveness western mentioned a moment ago. In fact, speaking of forgiveness involves talking of "fault," "Atonement," "repentance," every respect Christians, Jews or the best Muslims. Forgiveness is an action, action that Derrida defined as forgiving the unforgivable, and to that extent, we face two issues: first, overcoming language of the 'problem of forgiveness "(to speak philosophically) and, secondly, the criterion of the unforgivable.

To avoid getting into religious interpretations is that it comes from the political, because in this plane can talk to other concepts such as' responsibility ',' ethics', 'moral', 'value', 'justice' and 'truth '. However, there is also a problem here, it may be objected that forgiveness is an individual act, or, to Derrida: "I have no right to forgive or ask forgiveness on behalf of other individuals, both victims and criminals" (Derrida, 2001: 76). This means that even the state can be forgiven for its citizens. May be signed an amnesty, a peace agreement may be approved even a "law of justice and peace" but that does not mean that the victim be paid off or you have forgiven. We went for in the initial problem: What is forgiveness?

II
If Jankelevitch says that forgiveness may not have occurred in history and Derrida suspect that forgiveness is an excuse that is not forgiveness, and for that reason must forgive the unforgivable, that is, which is not justified (Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Trujillo etc.), forgiveness is an act that borders on magical, the miraculous: it becomes a gift. The gift, by definition, is a gift you have. Not everyone can forgive, and this should be clear. Only those who have been the victim can forgive. Here we find the Christian justification of turning the other cheek, since before the first strike (and as Jankelevitch may not even with that first hit) has not suffered, there has been a victim and therefore is not lawful to forgive, because it lacks the precondition having been offended. If he hit me but not to another, nor am I able to forgive for the Other.

"True forgiveness, regardless of legality, is a free gift of the victim to offender: true forgiveness is a personal relationship with someone" (Jankelevitch, 1999: 13) That someone is an ipso, a self. "Since I can not forgive the damage they did to others, forgive the damage they did to me, even though nobody has asked my forgiveness, I grant it." This from a religious reading is perfectly possible, because we understand that resentment is a state of unrest and that forgiveness is the opposite. Is forgiven for the welfare of the subject, for it to feel good about yourself. If you do not want to, if he clings to his resentment, over time, depending Jankelevitch, will mitigate the re-dry and end up feeling like a leaf detached from a tree. There will be no forgiveness there.

III
But why forgiveness is a gift? The answer (or part thereof) is given by Derrida: "if forgiveness is ethical, is, as Jankelevitch 'ethical hyperbolically," meaning that is beyond the standards, criteria and rules "( Derrida, 2001: 76). Not because of morality but because of the transgression of the rule is that forgiveness is a gift. There is a criterion - apart from being a victim-that determine what should or should not forgive, forgive and not only. If you are a victim, you can forgive. If the victim decides to do, is because it seeks reconciliation, either with the other-offender, or herself, but seek grace, tranquility (and here Jankelevitch has a point when he says that to understand is to forgive): but the Forgiveness does not mean forgetting or heal completely, if process may involve a new beginning, Arendt sense.

However, questions the ethical condition of the victim and the executioner, that is, responsibility: the question is whether you can appeal to the conscience of the executioner, it should rephrase the question for this one, to speak like the English: are you made to resist or be abused?

The ethics of forgiveness.
I
Forgiveness has two perspectives: victim and perpetrator. The victim does not do a favor to forgive the offender. Even the latter can be indifferent to be forgiven or not. Hence Jankelevitch hold the words of Christ on the cross: "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do", assuming that if they knew they had not, and from this analysis proposes a distinction between the evil is not evil , the more foolish than wicked innocent and the guilty who is more evil than stupid. These criteria are established taking into account the executioner, defining him... from a perspective of the victim.

This may seem a small thing but if you want to talk about forgiveness, we must ask the murderer, the executioner if you are interested in that forgiveness. Otherwise, forgiveness can only come in one self (intellection, language Jankelevitch), ie, the victim must grant a pardon is not going to air, but will itself. That forgiveness is not complacency, it can easily fall into resentment from that, "I have a right to be bitter and resentful, then I assert that right" (and that is the attachment to resentment Jankelevitch mentioned.) Forgiveness given when not requested a pardon is to be the conscience of the victim himself, a forgiveness that is forgiven himself. The victim must forgive her as a victim, she had allowed herself to be a victim. Talk with examples. Jean Amery well could have been suicide in the concentration camp was hard, but could have. However, he did not and, most strange ... then committed suicide.

In its arguments, Amery blames the world, a world that is alien to him, a world that can not be trusted: "Who knows whether the effect of moral responsibility resulting from the trust would not have granted and inhibited the criminal temptation and been provided that aflorase what a bright and noble can be found even in the hardened souls of evil "(Saramago, 2006: 25) Amery, like everyone, placed confidence in the world and this was betrayed, there can be no forgiveness. Not forgive himself for trusting. Addition had no one to appeal. Who were the culprits, the Germans? In a Europe that was largely anti-Semitic and a man who renounced that status, what forgiveness was there? The world, in full, with their organizations and their distribution was the culprit. You can not trust ... "you do it to yourself, just you, and that's what really hurts, to yourself, just you, you and no one else" (Just - Radiohead.)

II
So what is the ethics of forgiveness? Restore the victim and the executioner. As we make the mistake of putting eyes on the victim only when talking about forgiveness, because it is the victim who agrees to this right. But the hangman is not also entitled to a new beginning? And if any, should be sorry to access that right? The last question is answered immediately: "make repentance in the condition of the amnesty" was the task of apartheid. But how do you determine if the executioner is sorry? This is more complicated, however, in the specific case of damage done, we can say that repentance is measured by the willingness of repair, "in fact, victims often do not ask for no punishment, they just want to know where gone is the work of mourning that can continue. This is the service of a work of mourning, healing and rebuilding the body of the nation state "(Derrida, 2001: 70) Thus, the ethics of forgiveness is inclusive, victim and offender must have a willingness to reconstitution but this does not mean the victim must forgive if you do not want to, if you feel there is no chance of that. The willingness of reconstitution is-already-have understood political.

Indeed, no one sensible would argue that the executioner could claim to be forgiven. It's actually very little that can be demanded. -Forgiveness is an extreme situation, in that match and Jankelevitch Derrida. And for that reason, in such extreme situations, the executioner can demand anything, not even pity. That is up to the victim, his history and his judgment. So it was with Primo Levi: "All moral codes are, by definition, rigid: do not allow shades, or compromise, or influence each other. Taken or left en bloc "(Levi, 2006: 286). And further: "The moral universe of each, rightly interpreted, is identified with the sum of their previous experiences and thus represents an abridged form of his biography" (Levi, 2006: 292) Thus, if we eliminate the personal nature of the offense and proceed to more serious crimes, to attacks against humanity, for example, is it ethical to repair the executioner?

III
As I have insisted, the problem has been approached from the suffering, but pain who applies, who has the coercive means to do so, where is it? No one denies that the executioner to pay a debt to society has become, and that once the debt is paid it is not automatically forgiven, just as it should not. Not that the executioner should be forgiven, but certainly must play another role, otherwise he would be accused, it would kill him, he'd be in jail and that would stop the issue and no need of forgiveness and repair. There will only be an expiation for the old, corporal punishment and a Mass on behalf of the executioner for God to take pity on his soul. "When fighting a monster, beware of becoming a worse" Nietzsche.

The Repair
I
Indeed, it is ethical to repair the executioner also, not only because it is politically necessary, nor useful, but responsibility. Regardless of whether the victim has forgiven him, the executioner can and should be reinstated in society, as far as possible. We went into the basic problem of law, whether the penalty is imposed to punish and to suffer or to learn and correct.

Is it ethical for society include his executioners and look at the face, is unethical in that it is a responsibility. Make omission of that responsibility, made the blind is to let what happens happen. The ethic of responsibility demands a character, and the executioner there, is as real as the victim. It may be preferred to one another because both are products of a process, Amery called "torture." This torture also responds to another process. This reasoning comes the initial question of whether one is guilty by omission, if the omission is not another way of attacking.

II
To answer these questions is necessary to stop on the road and deal with only two questions and they show any insight (to use Jankélévicth). Two questions raised by Albert Camus, two questions that call for responsibility, two questions that, after Auschwitz, must be answered:

"" Yes or no, directly or indirectly, any abuse you want and violate? Yes or no, directly or indirectly, do you mistreat and violate? "All those who answered no to both questions are automatically confronted with a series of consequences that must change their way of posing the problem. " (Camus, 2002: 86)

Consequently, if we say no, we face a liability. Repair the executioner as such, ie, remove the label of executioner is part of that repair, as well as the victim must cease to be, as far as possible. The forgiveness of the unforgivable is a way to approach this process. Because "Hurbinek died in early March 1945, free but not redeemed" (Levi, 2006: 264). And although no Hurbinek killed, all were his executioners, and to leave a testimony like that, Primo Levi is appealing to the conscience of all, that is, it is also assuming as executioner.

"We dreamed at night fierce
Dense and violent dreams
Dream with the soul and body:
Back, eat, tell what happened. Until he heard stifled brief
The Order of Dawn "Wstawac";
And we heart to pieces.

We have now returned home,
We gorged belly,
We have finished our story.
It's time. Soon we will hear again
The foreign order "Wstawac" "Primo Levi.
Literature
     · Jankelevitch, Vladimir. THE forgiveness. Editorial Seix Barral, 1999
     · Derrida, Jacques.Word! Editorial Trot, 2001.
     · Amery, Jean. Beyond guilt and atonement. Attempts to overcome a victim of violence. Pretexts, 2004
     · Saramago, Jose. Blindness. Editorial Nomos, 2006
     · Levi, Primo. Auschwitz trilogy. Editorial The Aleph, 2006
     · Camus, Albert. Chronicles. Alianza Editorial, 2002

Eichmann: about the laughter and the knife

"Oh, Germany!
Who only hear the speeches
 that we receive from you will laugh.
But who sees what you do,
will draw the knife".
Bertold Brecht.


What is trivial?, Was the question that came to mind at first instance. I searched and found a sense that I found interesting, namely, trivial, common, pointless. Those were the key words for reading the text of the political theorist Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem. Does the evil has become trivial, banal? Arendt says yes, and the question we ask is why?

The mechanics of the book is an account of the judgment with philosophical and historical remarks that are intended to further understanding of the explicit words of Eichmann during his trial. However, the initial section of the book, which is the same as I've used for this text-reflects what can be read throughout the book, that is, the game between laughter and the knife. Indeed, laughter and the knife are Eichmann and Arendt is insistent in saying that during the trial, Eichmann was laughing or statements, to speak with precision, while the witnesses, the jury and the general public, had evidence did not laugh at all. On the one hand, Eichmann laugh by his speeches (who hears the speeches that we hear you laugh), but who knew what he had done and how he did it (who see what you do) wanted to kill him[1].

It was difficult to know whether he could be taken seriously Eichmann, and this constant dichotomy by whatever name, is reflected by Arendt all the time. I selected two passages that I consider essential: "For all this, it was essential to take him seriously, and this was difficult, unless taking the easy way to resolve the dilemma between the unspeakable horror of the undeniable facts and insignificance of man who had committed, he had a smart, calculating liar, which certainly was not. " And then on the same page: "Despite the efforts of the prosecutor, any could tell that this man was not a" monster ", but in reality it was difficult not to suspect that he was a clown" (P. 85).

Actually, it was expected to see a monster, evil made flesh in the person of Eichmann ... but it did not happen. What does this personification of evil? Arendt mentions that after the war, the Nazis began to judge each other: it was not me, that was it, nobody wanted to take things as far as it transpired in the Final Solution, but nobody blamed Hitler. And, seeing Hitler, I do not see the devil in person. What is happening? What was it that happened? And with much pain, with a lot of guilt in the conscience, Hannah Arendt concludes: "The German people were indifferent, but apparently cared that the country was infested with mass murderers, as none of them commit new murders on their own initiative, but if world opinion-or, rather, what the Germans call "das Ausland", which fall into one denomination all realities outside Germany insisted on that those persons are punished, the Germans were willing to please, at least to some extent". What happened was accustomed to the horror and evil, and Hannah Arendt questioned -as all the jews did- the thought to justify the very bad for a blind obedience to an "ideal".

Now, as we may be happening in Colombia about false positives. Is that everywhere in the world there will be an Auschwitz? And if this is true, why exactly compare with our false positives? What does the tragedy and the macabre with the mockery? Is laughter the middle of getting used to the horrors of existence? And I would argue yes, that consideration of whether Eichmann would not be a clown is so fundamental, because how can one laugh at a slaughter? Is not Colombia a country accustomed to horror, to the point that we laugh of our dead? The relationship between the tragic, the grotesque and the desire to laugh (for example the hippies and the response to the Vietnam War) is much deeper than you think, and takes root in the depths of human consciousness. We undertake to laugh, but ... why? ...

However, there is a call on this that Hannah Arendt on the subject when he wrote the following sentence, spoken by someone during the trial: "We want to make clear to all nations that millions of people, by the mere fact of being Jewish, and millions of children, by the mere fact of being Jewish children were murdered by the Nazis. " What does this mean? And the answer later Arendt puts it: "let us use again the words of Ben Gurion: "We want every nation know...to be ashamed". Indeed, we should be ashamed of what happened in World War II (because we can not exclude us with excuses like "I had nothing to do" and the like), and our false positives, but mainly be ashamed to laugh at these events to bear to live: "Who cares fight monsters to become turn into a monster. When you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you." Nietzsche.
 
Literature
Eichmann en Jerusalén. Segunda Edición en DeBOLS!LLO: diciembre, 2006

[1] If death is a punishment. What was wanted was justice, and should not forget what Arendt writes in one chapter: "Like all citizens of Israel, the prosecutor Hausner was convinced that only a Jewish court could do justice to the Jews and that these competing judge their enemies."